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THE TREBLE DAMAGE BONANZA: NEW DOCTRINES OF
DAMAGES IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS

S

Homer Clark*
7 of the Sherman Act, as amended by section 4 of the Clayton Act, gives a private right of action for treble damages to persons

ECTION

injured "in . . . business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws. . . ."-' The lucrative possibilities of this section

for plaintiffs and their attorneys have recently received sufficient notoriety to arouse curiosity concerning the legal doctrines involved.'
The purposes of the section have been said to include compensation
for those affected by violations,' prevention of violations, 4 and assistance for the government in discovering and bringing before the courts
persons who have violated the law.' In practice the last purpose has
hardly been achieved, since private suits generally are not brought until
the government wins a suit against a violator, after which the private
plaintiff can not only take advantage of section 5 of the Clayton Act,6
but can also rely on the successful legal theory developed in the governments case. The great complexity and expense of antitrust cases seem
to prevent any pioneering in the field by private plaintiffs, the proof of
which is that the landmark cases in recent times have not been treble
damage suits.
It also seems that the mandatory trebling of any recovery has
generated a natural reluctance in the courts to impose prodigious
damages upon violators of the act, although statements are to be found
in opinions to the effect that the judges do not let the compulsory
trebling of the damages influence their judgments.' Since the recoveries are likely to be large in Sherman Act cases, multiplying them
by three is not necessary as an inducement to litigate, unlike other types
of cases in which treble damages are allowed, so that this provision may
Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.-Ed.
iThe entire section reads as follows: "Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
26 Stat. L. 210 (1890), 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §15.
2Tsz, June 16, 1952, p. 88.
3Vold, "Are Threefold Damages under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?"
28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
4See United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 at 581, 68 S.Ct. 1169 (1948).
5Maltz v. Saz, (7th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 2 at 4.
6 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §16.
7 See Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1924) 297 F. 791 at 812.
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have hindered, rather than aided, accomplishment of the statutory
purpose.
Whatever the reason, it is generally agreed that until World War II
the treble damage suit was of relatively little importance, but that from
then on it grew in number and significance. 8 It now appears that the
treble damage suit may have a substantial effect both in compensating
the victims of violations, and in deterring violators who might be willing
to risk the nominal fines of a criminal prosecution, or even an equity
decree, but who would be slow to subject themselves to million-dollar
treble damage recoveries. Two reasons for this which come to mind
are (1) the chain reaction set off by the government's successful suits,
as for example in the moving picture industry; and (2) the development by the courts of a new, realistic doctrine of damages in such cases.
It is the latter of these reasons which will be discussed in this paper.
The cases, which arise upon varied facts, have for convenience in
discussion, and in an effort to avoid meaningless generalization, been
classified with reference to the relationships of the parties and the kind
of damages being claimed..
I.

Loss of Specific, Identified Sales or Customers

Where the plaintiff is able to prove that the effect of the defendant's
illegal conduct was to deprive him of particular sales, or of the business
of particular customers, the damages will include the profits which
would have been made on those sales or on the sales to those customers.9
The plaintiff in these cases usually has little difficulty in valuing his
loss, but sometimes is unable to show that the activities of the defendant
8

Compare the statements in note, 49 YALE L.J. 284 (1939) with those in note, 61
YAL. L.J. 1010 (1952).
9 Albert Pick-Barth v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., (1st Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 96, cert.
den. 286 U.S. 552, 52 S.Ct. 503 (1931); Frey & Son v. Welch Grape Juice Co., (4th
Cir. 1917) 240 F. 114. For other examples of this kind of claim see Peto v. Howell, (7th
Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 353, cert. den. 313 U.S. 583, 61 S.Ct. 1103 (1941) (plaintiff
alleged a comer in corn deprived him of sales); Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades
Council, (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 333, affd. (2d Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 426, cert,
den. 277 U.S. 594, 48 S.Ct. 530 (1927) (plaintiff claimed a boycott cost him a single
large customer); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, (2d Cir. 1915) 229 F. 77
(plaintiff claimed a price-setting combination lost him a valued customer); Atlanta Brick
Co. v. O'Neal, (D.C. Tex. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 39 (plaintiff alleged defendant's activities
caused him to lose several jobs on which plaintiff had been low bidder). In these cases,
except for American Sea Green Slate Company, the damages issue was not squarely
presented, usually for procedural reasons. In Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 37 S.Ct.
353 (1917), the plaintiff apparently claimed he had lost particular customers, but it is
not clear whether the jury took it into account in giving damages. See 243 U.S. 66 at 89,
37 S.Ct. 353 (1917).
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caused the loss. In McWhirter v. Monroe CalculatingMachine Co.,"0
for example, the plaintiff was a local district manager for the Marchant
Calculating Machine Company in Kansas City, selling calculating
machines on commissions. He proved a secret arrangement between
the defendant, a seller of competing machines, and others, by which
secret discounts were given to purchasers of defendant's machines. Although it held that this violated section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act," the court said that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the sales
he lost had been lost because of the discount. The plaintiff had shown
that about forty sales were made by the defendant under discount,
after the plaintiff had opened negotiations with the customers, and in
some cases had delivered his own machines to the customers for demonstrations. The court was persuaded by the testimony of a large number
of the buyers that they would not have bought the plaintiff's machines,
regardless of the discount, although several of them admitted that other
things being equal, the price would be a matter for serious considera10 (D.C. Mo. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 456. Apparently plaintiff in his complaint asked for
the amount by which his commissions had declined, but in proof limited himself to "every
sale where he was in competition with defendant and a discount was allowed." 76 F. Supp.
456 at 462. As the facts appear, it is hard to see how he could have made any other claim,
since the defendant gave the illegal discount on only forty machines, and that could
certainly not have affected plaintiff's commissions other than those attributable to these
particular sales.
This case is unusual in that the plaintiff was an employee of the corporation primarily
damaged by the defendant's illegal acts. His injury was the derivative one of a reduction
in his selling commissions by reason of a reduction in the business of his employer. The
court held that he was entitled to sue with little discussion of the form of the injury,
although other kinds of derivative injury are held not to be within the area of rights
protected by the antitrust acts, such as losses incurred by stockholders [United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 37 S.Ct. 509 (1917)]; or losses
incurred by creditors or officers of the corporation [Westmoreland v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 389, adhered to on reargument, 32 F. Supp. 731, affd.
(2d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 114]. A commission salesman of fire fighting equipment
whose complaint alleged that his business was harmed by the defendant's combination
prevailed against a motion to dismiss in Roseland v. Phister, (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d)
417. Another complaint was held good on a motion to dismiss in Vines v. General Outdoor
Advertising Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 487, where the plaintiff, also a commission
salesman, alleged that his employer withdrew a valuable account from him pursuant to an
illegal agreement between the employer and another firm. It seems that an ordinary salesman working on a salary would not be able to recover even though he could show that
the antitrust violations had cost him his job, though it is hard to find any convincing
distinction between the two kinds of employees. If the Westmoreland case turns on the
proof of injury, then the distinction is understandable, but it purports to say that stockholders, creditors and employees are entirely outside the range of interests protected. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, (D.C. Pa. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 312, excludes from recovery
against a distributor the owner of a theater who rented it to an exhibitor under a percentage
lease. The court held that the owner's injury was too remote, by which it seemed to mean
that his chances for increased rent, even if the theater's clearance and run improved, were
doubtful. The case further illustrates the judicial reluctance to recognize derivative injury
in this field.
1149 Stat L. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13(a).
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tion. The defendant's evidence to the effect that its sales grew faster
than those of the plaintiff's, even disregarding those made by means of
the discount, was also treated as significant by the court, which made
the familiar distinction between the fact of damage and its amount.
This distinction is meaningful here only because the evidence available to prove the fact of damage, which is to say causation, differs from
that available to prove its amount. The plaintiff would offer, as evidence that the defendant's violation caused the loss, the facts as to
difference in price, equivalence of the two machines and the motives
of buyers in making a choice. On the issue of amount he would
merely show what his commissions on the lost sales would have been.
With evidence of this kind before it, the court may say that causation
was proved, but amount was not, though that is not likely, since the
causation issue is the one hardest to prove. Yet even if the court should
say this, there seems to be no reason why a more liberal standard of
proof should be applied to evidence of one kind than another. In fact
in most cases this distinction is purely verbal, although the courts seem
to find in it a solace from the pain of deciding hard cases.
The interesting question raised by the McWhirter case is whether,
if the defendant had not been able to induce the customers to give
evidence of their motives, the court would have held that the plaintiff
had adequately proved that his loss of these sales was caused by the
defendant's illegal discounts. It is at least arguable that where the
plaintiff rests his claim on specific sales, he should be held to a stricter
standard of proof than where he merely claims a general loss of profits,
and that if he merely proves (a) the discounts and (b) that the customers bought from the defendant instead of the plaintiff, his evidence
does not clearly enough rule out the possibility that they may have been
influenced as much by the quality of the machines or other considerations as by the price. This merely amounts to the argument that where
the case admits of convincing proof, the plaintiff should lose if he fails
to produce evidence which will exclude alternative explanations of his
loss. I believe this is what the court means by saying that the fact of
damages must be proved without recourse to speculation. If this is
true, then the cases dealing with the recovery of profits generally are
not reliable authorities when the plaintiff is claiming a small number of
identifiable losses on specific sales, nor are the stricter requirements of
cases like McWhirter applicable to suits for profits generally.
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II. Lost Profits as a Source of Damages
By far the most common claim made by plaintiffs in treble damage
actions is that the illegal activities of the defendants prevented them
from profiting as much in their business as they would have in the
absence of those illegal activities. They do not point to specific transactions as a source of losses, but argue that the profits in general were
reduced. It is of course often stated hornbook damages law that damages must be proved with certainty, and lost profits are frequently held
not to be recoverable because the necessary certainty is not pioved.' 2
A noted authority has pointed out that the use of "certainty" is misleading here, the cases really requiring only that the damages be shown
with "reasonable certainty" or "probability.
Like many other legal
rules, this one is very easily stated, but as Professor McCormick emphasizes, it is capable of infinite variation in its use in individual cases.' 4
In fact, as I believe a close examination of the antitrust cases will show,
the doctrine has in this field been entirely transformed by a process of
gradual adaptation to new conditions, and although it is still given by
courts in their opinions as the reason for results reached, it by no means
describes the operations of proof which are now approved.
The early attitude of the federal courts on this issue, adopting the
conventional rule of damages, is shown by Central Coal & Coke Co. v.
Hartman,5 which is still relied on by defendants to show that expected
profits are not recoverable.-6 In holding that a verdict for the plaintiff
was unsupported by the evidence, the court in that case emphasized
two points: (1) The plaintiff failed to produce the best available evidence of his profits, such as his books of account, copies of contracts,
journals or invoices. (2) The estimates which he did make were proved
to be erroneous. The case could therefore be considered as holding
merely that the evidence offered was insufficient in view of what could
have been offered, but the language of the court seems to mean that
under no circumstances could the proof given support a verdict for
damages.' 7 In that, and in much of its general discussion, the decision
12

McCoRmcK, DAMAGEs 97-126 (1935); Daniel, "Enforcement of the Sherman Act
by Actions for Treble Damages," 34 VA. L. Rnv. 901 at 903-907 (1948).
13
McCoRmIc, DA AGEs 100 (1935). See Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman,

(8th 1Cir. 1901) 111 F. 96 at 98.
4McCorMIcx, DAmAGEs 124 (1935).
15 (8th Cir. 1901) 111 F. 96.
10 Brief for Respondent-Defendant, pp. 40, 41, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
17 111 F. 96 at 102, 103. Donovan and Irvine, "Proof of Damages under the AndTrust Law," 99 UNrv. PA. L. REv. 511 at 516, n. 27 (1940), cites this case as holding that
the plaintiff must submit the best evidence available to him.
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typifies the traditional method of handling this problem, stating that the
general rule is that profits are not recoverable, with the exception that
"the loss of profits from the destruction or interruption of an established
business may be recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably certain
by competent proof what the amount of his loss actually was."'" The
plaintiff here did give some evidence that he had lost customers, had
been unable to get a supply of coal, had suffered a decline in volume
of business and had received less profits than previously, and if his
testimony was believed, as it should be for purposes of the appeal, the
rejection of it by the court must have been on the ground of a relatively
strict application of the-conventional rule of damages, that is, that this
evidence was not reasonably certain, in the usual sense of that phrase.
It is interesting to note that the court did not mention the fact that
plaintiff was attempting to compare his profits before 1897, when he
himself was enjoying the benefits of the illegal combination, with the
years after that date, when he claimed the combination was oppressing
him. Several cases have denied relief for this reason, arguing that the
prior period cannot be used as a yardstick for measuring profits when
the plaintiff's profits during that time were magnified by his membership in the combine,19 in two of which the court seems to have been
persuaded that the plaintiff was in pari delicto, in addition to having
failed to prove his damages.20 In a third case, however, the court
squarely held that the plaintiff's lost profits could not be "ascertained
from profits which he had earned under a system whose sole purpose
21
was to maintain prices, restrict competition and create monopoly."
This holding clearly made it impossible for the plaintiff to recover any
profits, by ruling out in advance the only evidence available to him.
Another case, Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Company
of America,22 got the same result, under more dramatic circumstances,
for precisely the opposite reason. The plaintiff in that case was a manuF. 96 at 98.
19 First National Pictures, Inc. v. Robison, (9th Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 37, cert. den.
293 U.S. 609, 55 S.Ct. 125 (1934), rehearing den. 293 U.S. 631, 55 S.Ct. 141 (1934);
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (3d Cir. 1921) 271 F. 810; Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Blackmore, (2d Cir. 1921) 277 F. 694.
20 First National Pictures v. Robison and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, supra
note 21
19.
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (3d Cir. 1921) 271 F. 810 at 819.
22 (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 217. The case was tried twice. The first trial resulted
in a judgment for the defendant, which was reversed by the circuit court of appeals for
improper exclusion of evidence. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
(2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 236, cert. den. 293 U.S. 589, 55 S.Ct. 104 (1934). The second
trial gave the plaintiff a jury verdict for $956,300, which it lost as a result of the decision
discussed in the text, because part of the circuit court opinion on the first appeal was read
in the hearing of the jury. The case was finally settled. See note, 37 CoL. L. REv. 269
(1937).
18 111

1954 ]

DAmAGEs iN ANTITuST SUMts

facturer of aluminum products from aluminum ingot, who claimed that
the defendant, the sole domestic producer of ingot, had monopolized
interstate commerce in virgin aluminum; that it had combined with
foreign producers to fix American prices; and that it maintained,
through its subsidiaries, a "price squeeze" on independent fabricators,
by keeping the price of virgin aluminum high and the price of manufactured products low, so that independents who had to buy from
defendant could not make enough to meet their costs of manufacture.
Some of these claims were vindicated by the later case against Alcoa.23
In attempting to prove that it lost profits, the plaintiff's president was
allowed by the trial court to state his own estimate of what those losses
had been. Tht circuit court of appeals held that this was not admissible because the plaintiff's business had never shown a profit from the
time of its inception in 1919 until the suit was brought in 1931, so that
the presidents testimony was "nothing but a guess based on conditions
contrary to fact."124 Similarly, when the plaintiff put an expert consulting engineer on the stand, and asked him his opinion of the value
of the plant in 1925, on the hypothesis that there was a reasonable
prospect of profitable operation, the court held the answer inadmissible
because this was an impossible hypothesis, the plaintiff never having
operated at a profit.
The result was that if the plaintiff had been prevented from making
a profit by the defendant, the Baush case said his evidence of damages
was inadmissible, while if his past profits could have been inflated by
membership in defendant's combination, the Kemeny caseF" and others
like it said that the evidence was not sufficient to support a verdict. No
matter what effect the violation had on him, the plaintiff lost. A neater
device for protecting violators of the antitrust laws from treble damage
recoveries could hardly be invented. It is therefore hardly an exaggeration to say, with Judge Manton's dissent, 26 that restraint of trade had
only to be effective to be immune from private recovery.
There were other treble damage cases in the lower courts before
1945, most of them holding that damages were not proved with the
requisite "certainty,"'2 some approving plaintiffs' verdicts,2" but all
23

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416.
24 (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 217 at 227.
25 See note 21 supra.
26 (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 217 at 231.
27 Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., (4th Cir. 1926) 15 F.
(2d) 678, cert. den. 273 U.S. 757, 47 S.Ct. 459 (1926) (directed verdict for defendants
affirmed, partly because of failure to prove damages); Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, (2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 341, cert. den. 273 U.S. 703, 47 S.Ct. 97 (1926)
(judgment for defendant affirmed partly on the ground that plaintiff did not prove the
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purporting to accept the traditional dogmas of damages law. Some of
the cases which did uphold awards of damages entirely ignored the
fact that the plaintiffs' prior earning histories could have been affected
by the defendants' restraints, and to that extent evaded the Baush
dilemma.
30
Aside from an early case which in a dictum stated the usual rule,
the Supreme Court first dealt with the problem of proof of damages in
antitrust cases when it decided Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co."' The plaintiff in that case was a dealer in photographic
equipment and supplies in Atlanta, selling throughout the South. Before 1910 it bought supplies from the defendant, for resale to professional photographers. In that year the defendant bought out other
dealers in Atlanta, and when it was unable to buy out the plaintiff,
refused to sell to the plaintiff any longer at dealers' discounts. All of
alleged combination caused his loss); Jack v. Armour & Co., (8th Cir. 1923) 291 F. 741
(motion to strike petition granted for failure to allege that the injury was due to the
defendant's acts); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (3d Cir. 1921) 271 F. 810
(jury verdict and judgment for plaintiff reversed as to recovery of lost profits because plaintiff failed to show what he would have made in a free market); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Blacknore, (2d Cir. 1921) 277 F. 694 (jury verdict and judgment for plaintiff reversed,
with a dictum that plaintiff failed to prove damages with sufficient certainty); American
Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, (2d Cir. 1915) 229 F. 77 (judgment for plaintiff
reversed on the ground that the damages were not proved); Locker v. American Tobacco
Co., (2d Cir. 1914) 218 F. 447 (judgment for defendant affirmed, partly for failure of
proof on damages); Loder v. Jayne, (D.C. Pa. 1906) 142 F. 1010 (judgment for plaintiff
affirmed on condition he remit the amount given him for loss of profits, since he failed to
prove he had lost any profits).
Many of the earlier cases are discussed in the leading article on this subject, Donovan
and Irvine, "Proof of Damages under the Anti-Trust Law," 88 UNIv. PA. L. Rav. 511
(1940). See also, notes, 64 HA.v. L. Rev. 317 (1950); 41 ILL. L. Rav. 462 (1946); 35
CoL.2 L. REv. 335 (1935).
8White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., (8th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d)
600 (verdict and judgment for plaintiff affirmed where there was evidence of the reduced
value of plaintiff's theater); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., (2d
Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 651 (verdict and judgment for plaintiff affirmed where past profits
had not been affected by the defendant's activities); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort
Distilleries, (2d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 79 (verdict and judgment for plaintiff affirmed on
evidence similar to that in the Continental case); Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., (1st Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 96, cert. den. 286 U.S. 552, 52 S.Ct. 503 (1932)
(verdict and judgment for plaintiff upheld on estimates of plaintiff's employee); William
H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the U.S., (2d Cir. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 152, cert.
den. 282 U.S. 864, 51 S.Ct. 37 (1930) (estimates of what profits would have been earned
supported a plaintiff's verdict); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., (7th Cir. 1930)
44 F. (2d) 763 (verdict and judgment for plaintiff affirmed, damages being based on a
period of sales in a free market, and on a comparison of sales with those of others); Frey
& Son v. Welch Grape Juice Co., (4th Cir. 1917) 240 F. 114 (judgment for defendant
reversed, damages could be based on plaintiff's estimate of future profits).
2
9 See, e.g., William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the U.S., (2d Cir.
1930)3 42 F. (2d) 152, cert. den. 282 U.S. 864, 51 S.Ct. 37 (1930).
0 Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47 (1922).
31273 U.S. 359, 47 S.Ct. 400 (1927).
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this was done, as the jury found and the Supreme Court held, as a
result of a combination to monopolize interstate trade in photographic
materials. The question whether there was competent proof of damages
was one of those raised by the petition for certiorari.
The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that from 1901 on it
handled the defendant's goods, which it sold to photographers direct,
and not through retailers; " that it had sold varying but increasing
amounts of these goods at a gross profit of from 15 percent to 25 percent
of selling price;33 that in 1910 plaintiff took on the line of another
manufacturer, but that it could have continued to sell defendant's
products at a cost for handling of 5 percent;34 and that after 1910 plaintiff was able to supply only 25 percent to 50 percent of the materials
needed by professional photographers. 5 The defendant's evidence
showed that before 1910 the plaintiff had sold at prices fixed by the
defendant 6 and that for the years before 1910 the plaintiff had shown
a net loss on its total business, while it had a net gain in 1910 and
1911. " Apparently the plaintiff never was able to present sufficient
accounting evidence to show what, if any, net profit was attributable to
the defendant's line of goods.
Thus the defendant was able to argue (1) that the profits on these
goods before 1910 were never proved, (2) even if they were proved,
they were due to the illegal price-fixing system of the defendant,38 and
(3) there was nothing to indicate that there would have been any
profits after 1910 under any circumstances, or at least any more profits
than the plaintiff in fact earned. This latter argument is of course the
one which seemed to have persuaded the court in the Baush case to
say that the plaintiff could not offer in evidence an estimate of future
profits. Yet the Supreme Court here held that the jury verdict for the
plaintiff could stand, even without any estimate of future profits. The
Supreme Court seemed to accept the plaintiff's argument that it need
not show the amount of net profits from sales of defendant's products,
since it remained in business anyhow, and the increase in costs caused
by carrying defendant's line was only 5 percent. If that is accepted,
then the case is not hard, and would fit well enough into accepted
32 Transcript of Record, p. 150, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,
273 U.S. 359, 47 S.Ct. 400 (1927).
33 Id., pp. 184-189, 214-215.
34Id., pp. 261, 191, 192.

35 Id., p. 301.

36 Id., p. 323.
37 Id., pp. 236, 237, 239, 302, 313.

38 Id., p. 550 gives the decree in a government equity suit against Eastman, enjoining
the use of resale price maintenance terms in contracts.

372

MicmAN LAw

RE viEw

[ Vol. 52

doctrines of damages law, for the plaintiff would have proved the profits
of an established business and that those profits were wholly cut off
by defendant's illegal acts. The defense that plaintiff's profit was the
consequence of resale price maintenance the Supreme Court rejected
by a reference to plaintiff's evidence showing its pre-1910 profits were
no higher than those of manufacturers not parties to the Eastman
monopoly, although the evidence was that as soon as the price restrictions were lifted, prices were cut. 9 The Court seemed to think
that the plaintiff could have earned the same profits in a lawfully competitive market. The Court finally fell back on the often-used remark
that "a defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the
ascertainment of the precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not
entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible, '40 which of course
cannot mean what itsays. If it did, there would never be any problem
in these cases.
The Story ParchmentY' case was decided by the Supreme Court
only four years after the Eastman case, with an opinion by Justice
Sutherland. The plaintiff and defendant were in the relation of competitors, rather than that of buyer and seller, as in the Eastman case, in
the business of making and selling vegetable parchment, a paper chemically treated for use as a protective wrapper for foodstuffs. The
plaintiff went into this business in November 1927, at a time when
there were only three other firms in it, the two defendants and one
other corporation which could not be served. The complaint alleged,
and the evidence tended to show, that the defendants, together with
the other parchment manufacturer,, had, before the plaintiff entered
the field, combined to restrict production, fix prices, and had enjoyed
a substantial monopoly, which they sought to preserve against the
plaintiff's competition by conspiring to cut prices below cost of production. In June 1928 the plaintiff had to go out of business, after
only eight months of existence. In the district court the jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff for $65,000, finding, in the alternative, for
the defendant if as a matter of law the plaintiff should not be entitled
to a verdict. The judgment entered on this verdict for treble the
damages and attorney fees was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, on the ground that the evidence failed to support the
39 Id., p. 323.

40 273 U.S. 359 at 379, 47 S.Ct. 400 (1927).
41 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct.

248 (1931). Noted in45 Hav.L.REv. 193 (1931) and 39 YAr. LJ. 1035 (1930).
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finding of damages to the plaintiff. This court agreed that the finding
of a conspiracy was supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, and affirmed the judgment of the district court
for the plaintiff.
The damages claimed here were of two classes: (1) the loss of
revenue which resulted from the price-cutting, meaning the difference
between the actual prices and "reasonable" prices on the sales made by
the plaintiff, which amounted to about $20,000;42 (2) the depreciation
in the value of plaintiff's plant and equipment which occurred when
the plaintiff was forced to close down in June 1928.
The first claim of damages did not purport to ask for lost profits,43
as such, although the effect was the same. As phrased, it appeared to
be somewhat more definite than lost profits, since it made no claim that
the plaintiff would have sold more in volume, but only that the prices
would have been higher. There is a basic inconsistency in this claim,
because the complaint alleged, and the plaintiff argued, that the conspiracy had been in existence before the plaintiff entered the business,
and that it had maintained uniform prices,4" whereas at the trial the
plaintiff gave evidence to show that the prices so artificially maintained
were "reasonable."4 5 There was evidence that prices, after the price
war began, went below the point of profit-making, and even below the
cost of production, 46 although the business of both defendants continued to show net profits throughout the period.4" Apparently the
plaintiff's business never did show a profit. The circuit court of appeals,
Judge Anderson dissenting, refused to allow this claim of damage because as it said, there was a "moral certainty that, according to Nature's
first law, each of the three old companies, if no combination had existed,
in order to hold their trade would at least have met every reduction in
price made by the plaintiff to gain trade ...
48 The Supreme Court
got around this difficulty by saying in the first place that the fact of
damage was certain, and that only the amount was uncertain. In the
second place, it said that where the tort is of such a kind as to preclude
42
Transcript of Record, p. 600, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1931).
43 Id., p. 9.
44 Id., p. 8.
45Id., pp. 471, 508.
46 Id., p. 235.
47Brief for Respondents, p. 45, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1931).
48 (1st Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 537 at 541.
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certainty, it would pervert principles
ascertainment of damages 4 with
9
relief.
all
deny
to
of justice
In support of its first point the Supreme Court cited the rather
ancient New York case of Taylor v. Bradley,50 involving the breach of
a contract to lease a farm, in which the plaintiff claimed the benefits
which would have accrued to him from the lease. Aside from the
obvious objections to such a case as authority in Sherman Act litigation,
its language is misleading when applied to the facts of the Story case.
The fact-amount distinction is a procedural one which is valid only
where the legal injury is proved by one set of facts and the amount of
damages by another. In Taylor v. Bradley proof of a breach of the
contract established the legal injury, after which entirely different
evidence was relevant to the value of what the plaintiff had lost. This
is the usual order of proof in contract and most tort actions, such as
Linen Thread Co. v. Shaw,5' also cited in the Story case; in which a
seine broke, causing the plaintiff to lose a catch of fish already in the
net. The loss of the fish was the fact of damage, proved by evidence
that the fish were in the net and were lost through the defendanes fault.
The amount of damage turned on evidence on the number of fish in
the net and their value. In this case again the technique of proof involved two distinct and separable stages.
The treble damage suit for violation of the antitrust laws is quite
different. When the plaintiff complains that defendants' illegal acts
caused him to lose business, his evidence of the injury is not separate
from evidence of the injury's extent. The same testimony proves both,
and consists in statements about what plaintiff earned in the past, or
about what a comparable business earned, or in estimates by experts
of what plaintiff would have earned in the absence of the illegality.
On this state of the evidence, if he is held to have proved with sufficient
probability that he would have profited but for the defendants' tort, he
has proved with equal probability the amount of that profit. At this
point, in other words, the issues of liability and damages become one
49 282 U.S. 555 at 562, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1931). A recent application of this method
of computing damages is found in American Cooperative Serum Assn. v. Anchor Serum
Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 907. In that case the plaintiff sued for treble damages
for violation of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, giving evidence to show that the
defendant had sold hog cholera serum at discriminatory prices, thereby forcing the plaintiff
to cut its own prices from seventy-five cents to sixty-five cents. The court held that the
plaintiff could recover the difference in price on its sales in areas competitive with the
defendant during the period in which the price cuts had lasted, although it did not cite
the Story case.
50 39 N.Y. 129, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Rep. 363, 366, 367 (1868). The language
quoted by Justice Sutherland appears only in 4 Abbott.
51 (1st Cir. 1925) 9 F. (2d) 17.
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issue which cannot be split.5 2 Thus it makes no sense to say that
plaintiff proved the fact of damage and not the amount: if he proved
one, he proved the other.
One might argue here that even if this distinction is fictitious, it
serves the useful purpose of justifying the award of damages in meritorious cases. The answer is that the fiction can just as readily be made
to justify the opposite result, by a slight change in its terms. Instead of
saying that the fact of damage is shown with certainty, though not its
amount, the court could as well say that the plaintiff failed to prove
both the fact and the amount of injury and therefore could not recover.3 The result of discussing the subjective requirement of "certainty" in terms of a fictitious distinction can only be confusion.
The reliance in the Story opinion upon the related cliche that where
the tort is of such a kind as to preclude ascertainment of damages with
certainty, the plaintiff is excused from the usual burden of proving his
loss is also objectionable. This is a question-begging device. The
question in these cases is whether the defendants' activities caused the
loss, or whether some other factor caused it, such as the plaintiffs inefficiency, his lack of capital, or business conditions generally. It does
not help in answering that question to assume that the defendants' own

wrong has led to the loss, and then to say for that reason the plaintiff
need not give convincing proof of that fact. If the defendants caused
the loss, it is superfluous to say that the plaintiff need not prove it, as
he has already proved it. If defendant did not cause the loss, he should
not have to pay damages,- and the court cannot say that defendants'
wrong made proof impossible.
The second element of damages in the Story case, the depreciation
in the value of the plant, was based on plaintiffs evidence that the
plant had cost about $235,000,54 that it produced parchment of high
quality,55 that the machinery was larger and more efficient than that
52

Mr. Thomas C. McConnell, who represented the plaintiffs in the Bigelow and
Milwaukee Towne cases, contends that as a result of the Bigelow case "the measure of
proof for the fact of damage is identical with the measure of proof of the amount," and
that "either may be sustained upon a showing of any substantial evidence in the record in
support thereof." McConnell, "The Treble Damage Action," (1950) Uauv. ov ILL. LAw
FORum, 659 at 668. For a discussion of the conventional distinction between fact and
amount of damage, see note, 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932). For a discussion agreeing with the
argument of the text, see note, 64 Hxnv. L. Rnv. 317 at 318 (1950).
53 Justice Frankfurter does exactly this in his dissent in the Bigelow case, Bigelow v.
RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 at 267 (1946), distinguishing the Story case on the
ground that the plaintiff there did prove the fact of damage, while in Bigelow he did not.
54 Transcript of Record, pp. 562, 563, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248 (1931).
55 Id., p. 591.
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$75,000.

57

[ Vol. 52

and that it was worth, in June 1928, only

The latter figure was given as an estimate of value by the

plaintiff's treasurer and assistant secretary, who had no qualification,
other than his position, for making such a judgment. Since the damages for lost profits, as computed by the plaintiff, could not exceed
about $20,000, and the jury brought in a verdict of $65,000, it is clear
that part of the verdict at least was based upon the depreciation in the
value of the plant. The defendants' argument, with which the circuit
court of appeals agreed, was that there was no evidence of what the
plant would have been worth in June 1928 if the defendants had not
combined, so that no one could say to what extent depreciation was
caused by the combination. Defendants also argued that the plaintiff
would have gone out of business anyway for lack of capital, since its
assets had shrunk more than $100,000 in eight months of operation.58
The Supreme Court's solution to this problem was to say that it was
a matter for the jury to decide, and their findings were supported by
the evidence.59 The Court.said that here again the fact of damage was
not disputable, the amount alone being in doubt, but this is misleading,
since the defendant was arguing that the depreciation, if there was any,
was not caused by the combination, but would have occurred at all
events.
If Story is critically examined, its holding, though obscured by the
pseudo-distinction between fact and amount of damage, and by the
Court's strong moral feelings against letting a defendant excuse his
56 Id., pp. 591, 592.
57 Id., p. 564. Compare the Baush case, supra note 28, which refused to allow an

estimate of the value of plaintiff's plant at the beginning of the damage period because no
profits had ever been made. That ruling is not affected by the Story decision permitting
such an estimate as of the date plaintiff failed, where all operative facts had already occurred.
58 Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Story Parchment Co., (1st Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d)
537 at 541.
59 On this issue the Story case is followed by White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State
Theatre Corp., (8th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 600, in which the plaintiff asserted that the
defendant had conspired to monopolize the exhibition of motion pictures in a small Minnesota town by renting more films than he could show, in order to prevent the plaintiff from
getting them. The evidence of damage, which the court of appeals held would have
supported a verdict, consisted of testimony that the plaintiff's theatre building could only
be used for the showing of motion pictures, and that the value of the building and equipment had been cut in half as a result of the broker's activities, the witness being a Minneapolis real estate broker who had loaned money on this and other theaters in the area.
Transcript of Record, pp. 64-68, White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., (8th

Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 600. Here, as in Story, the court had little hesitation in holding
that such evidence was competent, and that it would support a verdict, although of course
the major cause of depreciation in the value of the property was the fact that it could not
be profitably used for the purpose for which it was designed, so that in effect this evidence
of value is evidence of loss of profits one step removed. For some reason, however, such

evidence appears more reliable to the courts than direct evidence that profits decline as a
result of the conspiracy.
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misconduct with the argument that the plaintiff could not have succeeded in business anyway,6" is seen to accomplish three significant
changes in the established rules of damages. (1) Most important, the
case allowed a plaintiff to recover who was not well established in business, had no record of earnings to serve as a comparison, and who in
fact could hardly be said to have gotten a foothold in business at all. It
would not be a long step from this case to allow recovery for exclusion
from business. The strength of the holding on this point is slightly
weakened by the fact that the plaintiff's theory called for recovery of
a difference in price, rather than of profits as such. (2) The case
accepted. as a yardstick for measuring "reasonable" price a price level
which was reached when the industry was in the grip of a strong combination in restraint of trade. (3) The Court refused to deny relief
merely because the price cuts might have resulted from the independent
action of the defendants, even if there had been no combination. The
defendants strongly argued that the damages were speculative for that
reason. Present economic theory of the operation of an oligopolistic
market seems to predict relatively stable prices in such a market,6 ' so
that on the probabilities of the situation the Court may have been
correct.

The latest and most important of the Supreme Court trilogy on
antitrust damages is the Bigelow case, 2 which made the later Paramount holding a available to private plaintiffs in the movie industry.
The plaintiffs in the case were the owners of the Jackson Park movie
theater, which was located on Chicago's South Side. They had acquired the theater in 1936. The defendants were the large national
distributors of movies, RKO Radio Pictures, Loew's, Twentieth Century-Fox, Paramount, Warner Brothers and Vitagraph, a subsidiary of
Warner. Two Chicago exhibitors were also named as defendants,
Balaban & Katz Corporation, a subsidiary of Paramount, and Warner
Brothers Circuit Management Corporation, a subsidiary of Warner.
One or another of the defendants operated each of the six competing
theaters in the neighborhood of the plaintiffs' Jackson Park. The most
nearly comparable of the six was the Maryland, run by Balaban &Katz.
Thus in the Bigelow case the relationship of the parties was a combination of the relationships in Eastman and Story: the defendants were
60 The moral attitude is even more obvious in the dissent to the lower court's opinion.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Story Parchment Co., (1st Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 537
at 544.
61 BAm, PRIcNG, DIsTRt3UToN AND EMPLOyME.NT 180-184 (1948).
62 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
6
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).

3 United States v. Paramount Pictures,
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both suppliers and competitors of the plaintiffs. For that reason it was
perhaps a little easier to show that the defendants caused plaintiffs'
losses in the Bigelow case than in Story.
The plaintiffs' contention was that the operation of the "Chicago
system" of uniform clearance, run and admission price by the defendants had prevented them from getting feature pictures for first runs,""
and in that way had caused the plaintiffs to lose earnings in the amount
of $120,000 over the five-year period from July 28, 1937 to July 28,
1942. The "Chicago system," found by the jury to have been imposed
by a conspiracy of all the defendants, set up a first run called the Loop
run, in the large theaters of the Loop, with a three week clearance over
all other theaters in the city. The next showings were called the A
pre-release, the B pre-release, and the C pre-release, followed by weeks
of general release. There were varying clearances set between A, B
and C pre-release runs. The Jackson Park theater had been assigned
the first week of general release, which meant that it showed films ten
weeks after they were first shown in the large loop theaters. Six of the
eight theaters competing with the Jackson Park had better playing positions than it did, ranging from A pre-release to C pre-release. One
played on even terms with the Jackson Park. The other competing
theater played in the second week of general release, one week behind
the plaintiffs' theater. The comparable Maryland theater played in
the C pre-release bracket.
There was evidence from which the jury could have found that no
matter what rent the plaintiffs offered for films, the defendants, in
carrying out their conspiracy, refused to license films to the plaintiffs
for any run in advance of the one assigned, and that the Jackson Park
in size, location and appointments was equal or superi6r to the Maryland. The plaintiffs' evidence also showed that, commencing in 1936,
the defendants began to show double features in their theaters, thereby
using many more films and removing from the market some of the films
which the Jackson Park theater had been able to get before they had
been played in a prior Chicago run.65
The jury found for the plaintiffs in the amount of $120,000. On
appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the verdict was supported by.the evidence on the issue of liability, but that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove their damages by substantial competent
64 See plaintiff-s' complaint, Transcript of Record, p. 11, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
65 Id., p. 211.
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evidence.6" Certiorari was granted to consider the damage issue. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and
affirmed the judgment of the district court for the plaintiffs. 68
The evidence by which the plaintiffs sought to prove their damages
consisted of a comparison of their actual earnings under the "Chicago
system" with (1) the earnings of the Maryland theater for the same
period; and (2) the earnings of the Jackson Park theater for the four
year period just before the plaintiffs acquired it. The theory of this
latter evidence was that there had been some "clear product" available
to the Jackson Park in the earlier period which was reflected in higher
admissions, but that this "clear produce' was used up by double featuring in the prior runs after the plaintiffs acquired the Jackson Park
theater. The first comparison indicated that the Maryland theater had
earned net receipts $115,982.34 in excess of those of the Jackson Park,
after allowing for a difference in film rent between the two theaters.69
The second comparison showed that the Jackson Park had earned
$125,659.00 more in the period 1933 to 1937 than in the period 1937
to 1942, after compensation for the shorter period and for the effect
of "Bank Night' on the receipts of the earlier period.7°
Since there was testimony that the "Chicago system" had been in
effect at all times from 1927 or before to the date of suit,7 1 and since the
system affected all theaters, the case squarely presents the question of
whether there can be competent evidence of damages when there is no
possibility of proving what the plaintiffs' receipts would be in a market
not controlled by the combination. The court of appeals disposed of
this question by holding that (1) the comparison with the Maryland
earnings did not support the verdict by over $4,000, and therefore must
not have been relied on by the jury; (2) the comparison with the prior
earnings of the Jackson Park did not support the verdict because the
plaintiffs' contention was that they could have earned more if allowed
to bid in any open market, unembarrassed by the "Chicago system,"
while the prior earnings were obtained under the very same system, and
thus proved nothing about what the plaintiffs might have been able
to earn in a free market. The same objection of course also applied to
the evidence on the Maryland's earnings. The court then said that
66

Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., (7th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 877.
Bigelow v. RIKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 326 U.S. 709, 66 S.Ct. 144 (1945).
68 See note 62 supra. Justice Jackson took no part, and Justice Frankfurter dissented.
69
Transcript of Record, p. 476, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,
66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
70 Id., p. 477.
71 Id., pp. 540, 708.
67
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the proper measure of damages here would be the excess of plaintiffs'
hypothetical profits, if they had been able to bid for pictures on an even
footing with all other theaters, over their actual profits under the
"Chicago system." The court never squarely faced the objection that
this would effectively rule out recovery against the old, highly organized
combination, since such evidence would never be available.
The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Stone writing the opinion,
held that the jury verdict was supported by the evidence of the prior
earnings of the Jackson Park theater, expressly refusing to say that it
would not be supported by the other class of evidence, however. The
opinion reached this result by a logical, highly specific argument, which
it later buttressed by more general considerations and by reference to
applicable cases. The argument ran as follows: (1) The jury clearly
could find that it was advantageous to an exhibitor to show on prior
runs, both because of the power of attraction inherent in novelty and
because newer pictures could command higher admission prices. (2)
Both classes of evidence tended to show that prior runs brought greater
returns. (3) Under the complaint as drawn and the charge to the
jury, the jury could have found, and will be presumed to have found,
that the price fixing was the result of defendants' individual, not collective, action, and that therefore it could not be said that the conspiracy, by price maintenance, had benefited the plaintiffs as much or
more than it hurt them by relegating them to a late run. (4) The
plaintiffs were entitled to show films which had not been previously
shown, free of unlawful restraints, and the measure of the value of
that right was the amount by which receipts declined when the right
was lost in 1937, by the defendants' adoption of double featuring.
The bare account of this reasoning is enough to indicate its relatively narrow application to the particular facts of this case. If this
were all the case held, it would hardly have been worth the time and
trouble of the Supreme Court, and certainly would not justify any
generalizations about proof of damage in antitrust suits. There is
plenty of evidence, both in the opinion and in the factual context of
the case, however, to show that a new judicial attitude toward proof
of injury had developed within the shell of old doctrine and factual
reservation.
In the first place, the attempt by the Chief Justice to show that the
conspiracy did not distort market conditions other than to deprive
plaintiffs of clearance and run advantages -is entirely unconvincing,
since the evidence made it very clear, as the plaintiffs' own brief in the
Supreme Court argued, that clearance, run and admission price were all
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interdependent factors in a single conspiracy, each being a function of
the others, and each being necessary for the successful operation of the
"Chicago system, 72 the purpose of which was to maintain high prices
and high profits on the prior runs. Furthermore, the jury must have
considered the effect of the conspiracy on price, since it was instructed
to find what part of the Jackson Park's profits in the earlier period
would have been "derived from operation under conditions of free and
open competition and not from operati6n in the playing position, under
the clearances and minimum admission prices of the so-called system
of release. . . .-7 Thus the case is one in which the only evidence
of injury related to a wholly administered market, but which allowed
the jury to consider that evidence in awarding damages.
In the second place the Court said that this case was comparable to
Eastman Kodak"4 and Story Parchment75 in that the tortious acts precluded ascertainment of the damages by a comparison of market conditions under the conspiracy with what would have prevailed in a freely
competitive market, ignoring the distinction that the two earlier cases
had each contained affirmative evidence that the conspiracy had not
distorted prices or profits during the yardstick period, while that sort of
evidence is not found in Bigelow. Since the court of appeals expressly
made this distinction, it appears that the Chief Justice did not overlook
it, but was in effect saying that the distinction is unimportant, and that
the sort of evidence relied upon in Eastman, Story and Bigelow will
support substantial damages even if it does not provide a comparison
with a free competitive market, unaffected by the illegal combination.
Finally, other indications that this is the meaning of the Bigelow
opinion are found in the Court's statement that in all three cases the
jury "could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from
the proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure
plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence of the decline in prices,
profits and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes, that
defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the plaintiff," 7 and
in the statement farther along that "the wrongdoer may not object to
the plaintiff's reasonable estimate of the cause of injury and of its
72 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 9-13, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946).
73 Transcript of Record, p. 1271, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,
66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
74Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 47 S.Ct. 400
(1927).
75
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. 248
(1931).
76 327 U.S. 251 at 264, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946). Emphasis supplied.
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amount, supported by the evidence, because not based on more accurate
7
data which the wrongdoer's misconduct has rendered unavailable. 't
The Court insisted that there was nothing new in all this, citing damages cases in other fields,7 but most of the cases cited arose out of
situations where the causation of substantial injury was clear enough,
the only problem being to place a money value on the injury. As I
have argued, 9 the antitrust cases are significantly different in that the
issue is whether the defendant's acts caused any injury to the plaintiff.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Bigelow case rests on this distinction,
saying that the plaintiffs failed to show that any legal injury had been
done them."0
What guides then does Bigelow furnish for courts and lawyers to
follow in the trial of subsequent cases? The result of the case, it seems
to the writer, is to suggest the analysis of treble damage suits into the
following issues:
1. Did the defendants violate the antitrust laws? In the Bigelow
case this was not before the Supreme Court and is outside the scope
of this paper.
2. What effect, if any, did the violation have upon the market
or segment of the business world in which the plaintiff operated? The
Supreme Court in the Bigelow case did discuss this problem, and found
that the effect was solely to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining first-run
pictures. This paper has attempted to show that the evidence will not
bear that construction. The issue here is a more precise one than the
general question of what were the effects of the acts alleged to be in
violation of the statute, which general question is relevant to a determination that the acts alleged did constitute a violation. In the movie
cases the precise effect on the plaintiff's market can be plainly defined,
as for example the deprivation of first-run movies and the fixing of
prices which plaintiff must charge. In o'ther cases the effect may be
quite obscure.
77 Id. at 265. Emphasis supplied.
8

7 Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 169 U.S. 26, 18 S.Ct. 255 (1898), held
the railroad illegally occupied a street abutting on his land, thereby reducing the land's value.

It was clear that some depreciation had been caused by the defendant's act. The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 125 (1873), divided the damages caused by a collision at sea
between the two vessels, since both were at fault, and the Court presumed that the fault
contributed to the injury. Another cited case, Great Southern Gas & Oil Co. v. Logan

Natural Gas & Fuel Co., (6th Cir. 1907) 155 F. 114, dealt with the ascertainment of
damages after the tortious confusion of goods, where the cause of the wrong was plain,
using the best available estimate of its extent.
79 Pp. 376-377 supra.
80 327 U.S. 251 at 266-268, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946).
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3. What is the value in dollars of the opportunity to operate in
a freely competitive market,"' of which the plaintiff has been deprived
in certain specific ways? Here the Bigelow case allows the plaintiff to
bring in the best evidence of the value of this opportunity available to
him, and says that the decision of the trier of fact on this evidence shall
stand. The question is thus to be decided like other questions relating
to the fact of causation, without meaningless references to certainty,
and with awareness that the statute is not to be nullified by the subterfuge of imposing impossible requirements of proof.
Other explanations of the Bigelow' case have been given. Judge
Wyzanski, in Momand 'v. Universal Film Exchange,8 2 suggests that
"the ratio decidendi of the Bigelow case is that where the evidence in
an Anti-trust case is such that the discrepancy between plaintiff's earnings and a competitor's earnings or between plaintiff's earnings in one
year and another year could be found by a jury to be entirely unexplained except by acts of defendants which are unlawful under the
Anti-trust laws then the jury may find defendants are the jural cause of
the discrepancy, that is, of the loss." This is a statement of the narrow
holding of the case, but as has been shown above, the facts, contentions
and charge will not support such a narrow construction of the issue
which was allowed to go to the jury. On those facts it cannot be said
that the discrepancy was wholly unexplained except for the fact that
plaintiffs were discriminatorily deprived of earlier runs. Many explanations other than the depressing effect of the restraint were available
and were offered by the defendants. Judge Wyzanski goes on, however,
to point out that the Bigelow case may be given a broader significance,
so as to mean that the plaintiff may recover upon proof of illegality and
evidence that he has had lower earnings than his own prior record, or a
theoretically normal period, or a comparable competitor; that segregation and measurement of the cause of loss is impossible; and that the
defendant's acts were the dominant or main cause, or perhaps among
the known factors the most substantial in causing the loss.8"
Unfortunately for the elucidation of the law the Momand case did
not directly raise the issue, because the plaintiff in that case had sued
in another district on somewhat the same cause of action and lost, so
that both Judge Wyzanski and the circuit court of appeals held that he
81

Apparently the plaintiff could get nominal damages even without proving the value
of his lost opportunities. See United Exhibitors, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Distributing
Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 316.
2

8 (D.C. Mass. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 469 at 480, affd. Momand v. Universal Film
Exchanges, (1st Cir. 1948) 172 F. (2d) 37.
83 Ibid.
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had to make a much clearer showing of causation than if he had been
suing for the first time in the Massachusetts district court. In other
words, because he was bound by doctrines of res judicata as to certain
activities of the defendant, the plaintiff had to show with considerable
particularity that defendant's other illegal acts had caused the loss, and
this he failed to do. Nevertheless, Judge Wyzanski's evaluation of the
Bigelow case, even though dictum, is important. In its effort to define
the degree of causation, however, it is rather unsatisfactory. Words
like "dominant, "main," "preponderant" or "substantial," as applied
to cause, by giving an illusion of meaning, block further analysis.
It has also recently been suggested that the Bigelow case supports
recovery of the defendant's profits, as distinguished from the plaintiff's
losses. 4 This is of course the usual measure of recovery in equity suits
for unfair competition or patent infringement. It is pretty clear that,
although the Bigelow case did cite unfair competition and copyright cases,85 the equity measure of recovery was not being adopted,
these cases being cited merely to show that impossible burdens of apportioning a loss among various possible causes are not imposed on
plaintiffs in other areas of the law. The actual measure of damages in
the Bigelow case appears to have been the comparison with plaintiffs'
own prior earnings record, although the Court makes it reasonably plain
that a recovery based on comparison with the earnings of the competing
theater would have been upheld. This is not to say that the competing
theater's profits as such would be awarded to the plaintiffs. In the
patent, copyright or trade-mark cases the profits which the plaintiff
recovers are the product of the appropriation of a single device, work
of art or distinctive mark, and are therefore relatively easy of determinationl, except where the defendant adds other profit-producing
elements, as in the Sheldon case. But in the usual antitrust suit the
defendant's profits arise from an illegal course of conduct not related
to specific property of the plaintiff, so that it would be even more difficult to isolate the profits which the plaintiff ought to recover than to
ascertain legal damages.
84

McConnell, "The Treble Damage Action," (1950)
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659 at
85 668.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 60 S.Ct. 681
(1940) (plaintiff may recover only so much of defendant's profits as were attributable to
the use of plaintiff's play); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U.S.
251, 36 S.Ct. 259 (1916) (plaintiff not required to make an apportionment of defendant's
profits where that is impossible); Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric
and Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 32 S.Ct. 691 (1912) (plaintiff in patent suit need not
apportion profits where patented device is inextricably mingled with other elements).
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In the movie cases there is a superficial resemblance because copyrighted films are used, but even there it would be difficult to allow the
plaintiff to recover the defendanes profits. In the Bigelow situation,
for example, the plaintiffs might claim the profits of the Maryland
theater under this theory with perhaps some plausibility, but if there
were another independent competing in the same neighborhood, the
court could hardly hold that he also could recover the profits of the
Maryland theater. The theory of the equitable recovery of profits is
that the defendant has benefited from the use of a specific thing which
in fairness ought to belong to the plaintiff, and which usually has a
value which is very difficult to predict. The theory of treble damage
suits, however, is that the defendants illegally deprived the plaintiff of
an opportunity to do business in a competitive market. The profits
which the defendant is able to make usually have no relation to the
value to the plaintiff of that opportunity.
Furthermore, in industries other than the movies, the profits of the
defendant often have no conceivable bearing on the plaintiff's recovery,
due to difference in location, size, type of business or methods of sale
and production. 6 On the whole, therefore, it would seem that the
equitable doctrine of recovery of defendant's profits would be less workable, and would cause more difficulty, than the legal rules of damages
applied in the Bigelow case.
At least two cases recently have decided the issue raised but not
precisely determined in Bigelow by allowing plaintiffs to prove their
lost profits by comparison with the earnings of theaters run by the
defendants. s The second of these cases went further, to affirm a
judgment based partly upon expert testimony about what the plaintiff
would have earned if it had had an unrestrained opportunity to license
first-run films," the sort of evidence which the Baush case 9 had held
would not support an award of damages. On the other hand even under
86

1Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F. (2d)

534 (7th Cir.

1953) reversed a lower court's award of damages based upon the defendant's profits, finding
no evidence that the plaintiff's sales would have equalled the defendant's in the absence

of the restraint.
87 Theater Investment Co. v. RIKO Radio Pictures, Inc., (D.C. Wash. 1947) 72 F.
Supp. 650; Bordonaro Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, (2d Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d)
594. 8 8
On the issue of damages, Judge Clark said: "Damages in such a situation neces-

saily cannot be assessed with mathematical precision; but the testimony of plaintiff's
expert witness, Samuelson, 'while purely an estimate and introduced as such, was proof of a
kind as definite and certain as the subject-matter admitted.'..

. Defendants must not be

allowed to create their own immunity by the extent and duration of their conspiracy." (2d
Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 594 at 597.
89 See note 22 supra.
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the Bigelow ruling it is clear that the trier of fact may find that the
losses were the result of factors other than the action of the conspiracy."
The effect of the Bigelow case can nowhere be perceived more
clearly to be a departure from the usual rules of damage than in Milwaukee Towne Corporation-v. Loew's, Incorporated.1 The plaintiff's
contentions were very much like those in the Bigelow case, to the effect
that the defendants, six of the major national distributors and their
subsidiaries, conspired to monopolize and restrain trade in the exhibition of movies in Milwaukee by adopting the "Milwaukee plan" of
release, which gave preference and priority to defendants' theaters over
that of the plaintiff. The district court tried the case without a jury.
It found that the "Milwaukee plan" was set up in 1930, the theater
which plaintiff later acquired being assigned to a second run position
following a twenty-eight day clearance.92 The plaintiff was organized
in 1946, ran the theater from May to August of that year, then remodeled it at a cost of $200,000, and reopened in December. The
district judge found that it was a modern, up-to-date and beautiful
theater, suitable in all respects to be a first-run house, and in fact was
a first-run theater for United Artists' pictures, but that was not sufficient
for full time first run operation. Under the "Milwaukee plan" the
court found that clearance, run and admission price were established
by the defendants for the various theaters,93 and that although the
plaintiff asked the defendants for first-run films on several occasions,
commencing in April of 1946, plaintiff was told that its theater was a
second-run house, and that all first runs were going to the Fox and
Warner theaters. The district court found damages of $431,959.42.
90 Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 716,
affd. without discussion of damages, (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 951, cert. den. 72 S.Ct.
363, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
91 (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 72 S.Ct. 302, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
The lower
court's decision is printed in (D.C. Ill. 1950) 100 F. Supp. 90.
92
Transcript of Record, pp. 3326-3349, Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., (7th

Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561.
93

One's skepticism of the efficacy of antitrust decrees is strengthened by the court's
finding numbered 17: "Sometime subsequent to June 11, 1946 and pursuant to the opinion

of the statutory court in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in the case of United States vs. Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al., defendants removed
from their license agreements the provision fixing minimum admission prices but directed
their Branch Managers contemporaneously therewith to watch reductions in admission prices
and to advise the home office in the event that any such reduction took place which was
likely to adversely affect other theaters and that at that time pictures were being licensed
picture by picture so that the distributors and each of them still maintained the position of
being able to refuse clearance or refuse a license if the relative admission prices as set forth
originally in the uniform zoning and clearance schedule as a basis for the respective

clearances were not maintained." Transcript of Record, p. 3331, Milwaukee Towne Corp.
v. Loew's, Inc., (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561.
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The circuit court of appeals held that there was no substantial evidence
to support the finding that plaintiff had demanded first runs in April
1946, and that the plaintiff could not recover for the period from May
to August of that year, before the theater was closed for remodeling.
The court affirmed the judgment as to the later period, from December
1946 to July 1948, in the amount of $313,858.10, trebled.
The plaintiff's evidence of damages consisted of a comparison of
the receipts in the plaintiff's Town Theatre with the receipts from
two of defendant Fox's first-run theaters, the Wisconsin and the Palace,
for the two periods between 1946 and the date of the complaint.9 4 This
was buttressed by testimony of the plaintiff's president and principal
stockholder that with first-run pictures the plaintiff's receipts would
have equalled those of the Wisconsin and Palace,9 5 by evidence that
plaintiff's theater was comparable to the other two, and superior in some
respects,"8 and that it was able to gross as much at the box office as the
defendant's theaters when it was able to get pictures of comparable
quality. 7 The defendant countered with evidence that from the date
of suit to the date of the trial the Towne Theatre, which was then
getting first-run films, had failed to take in nearly as much in receipts
as the other two theaters." The defendants also gave evidence tending
to show that with first-run pictures and larger admissions the plaintiff
would have had much greater advertising expenses, and that its other
operating expenses would have been greater. 9 Finally the defendants
argued that the plaintiff's theater was not suitable for first-run films
during the earlier period before the remodeling. 10°
The district court's award of damages was based directly on the
comparison with the Wisconsin theater receipts. The circuit court of
appeals held that this was a "matter for the judgment of the trial
court,"' 01 so far as the period after plaintiff remodeled its theater was
941d., p. 2337.
95Transcript of Record, pp. 415-418, 429, 430, Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561.
06 Id., pp. 131, 373, 809, 810, 830.

97id., pp. 411, 412, 2366. The plaintiff's exhibit 80 compared admissions of the
Towne Theatre with those of the Wisconsin and Palace Theatres on specific occasions when
the Towne Theatre was able to get outstanding films on a prior run, and tended to show
that it could then draw larger admissions than the other two.
98Id., pp. 3098, 3100. The defendants' calculations indicated that during this "yardstick period," after suit was brought, but before trial, the plaintiff's receipts increased and
those of the Wisconsin and Palace declined, but the latter two remained substantially
ahead of the Towne.
99 Brief of Appellants, pp. 89-97, Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., (7th Cir.
1951) 190 F. (2d) 561.
100 (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561 at 566.
101 Id.at 567.
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concerned, although it seemed to have some doubts about the desirability of computing damages in this way. The Bigelow case rationale
was held to justify the comparison with other theaters, provided the
fact of damage was shown. As has been argued, however, the Bigelow
case seems to have said that the methods of proving the "fact' of damage
are to be judged on the same standard as methods of proving amount,
and in fact to have said that there is no valid distinction between the
fact and amount in cases of this kind.
As to the first period during which the plaintiff claimed to have
been deprived of first runs, the court of appeals reviewed the evidence
and found that the statement of plaintiff's president that he had demanded first runs as early as April 1946, could "be given little, if any,
credence."' 1 2 It held for that reason that there could be no recovery
for losses occurring during this period. Aside from the obvious objection that the court was upsetting a finding which was primarily a
matter of credibility, this is dubious as a matter of law. As the situation
was developed by the evidence, it is obvious that a demand for first runs
by the plaintiff would have been useless, since all later demands of that
kind were rejected. The court was thus denying recovery for a substantial part of the alleged loss on the ground that the plaintiff did not
make a request which would clearly have been futile, at a time when
the defendants had long made it clear plaintiff's theater was to be
allotted no better than second run films. The court's reliance on evidence tending to show that the Towne theater was not suitable for
first-run pictures as a means of showing no demand had been made
leads one to suspect that the real reason for denying recovery here was
that the plaintiff failed to prove the Towne theater was a proper firstrun house before the remodeling. Although the defendants' evidence
was quite persuasive on the point, it did not persuade the trial court,
and there was certainly sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
findings. For that reason the decision on this branch of the case is
open to some question.
The Milwaukee Towne case is important, not only because it marks
the capitulation of the Seventh Circuit in treble damage suits,"0 3 but
Ibid.
At least three recent treble damage cases went against the plaintiff in the Seventh
Circuit and were then reversed by the Supreme Court for various reasons: Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 66 S.Ct. 574 (1946); Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951); Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 408 (1951).
102

103
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also because it is a square holding that under the Bigelow doctrine a
comparison of plaintiff's receipts with those of defendants' competing
theaters will support an award of damages to the full extent of the
difference between them,' 0 4 even though the competing theaters had
the advantage of their own illegal practices, and even though the defendants introduced substantial evidence tending to explain or rebut
the plaintiff's figures. This is a long way from the traditional rules of
05
damages as stated, for example, in Central Coal & Coke v. Hartman,"
or Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.'
By allowing a
comparison with businesses other than that of the plaintiff, it enables
recovery to be had for injuries which are not only not well established,
but which are not even in existence, where the reason for their nonexistence is the illegal conduct of the defendant. Finally, the case is
a strong indication that the Bigelow case is not to be limited to its precise facts, but is to be given the broad construction suggested previously
in this paper.
Although the motion picture industry has been the proving ground
for recent developments in damages under the antitrust acts, there have
been some cases dealing with other industries and different factual
104 The trial court's conclusion of law numbered 11, which, not being reversed by the
court of appeals, must have been considered a proper statement of the applicable rule,
answers the defendants' argument that the plaintiff should not recover the entire difference
between the two theaters' receipts, since it was dear that the total first-run business would
not have been larger under competitive conditions, and therefore the Towne and the
Wisconsin would have split the difference, the Towne improving its receipts and the
Wisconsin losing receipts, but that the two would not be likely to exchange places: "Plaintiff was entitled as of tight to purchase and show film free of the restraints of the unlawful
distribution system. A fair measure of the damage to that right by defendants' unlawful
distribution system was the loss by plaintiff of admission receipts as the result of the application of that system to plaintiff's business, and in this case where defendants have mingled
admission receipts of their own with admission receipts which, except for defendants' own
wrongdoing, would have been received by plaintiff and where defendants have made it
impossible for plaintiff to show in what proportions, if any, defendants have a right to
box-office receipts in their theatres, there is legal justification for the conclusion that without
the restraints imposed by defendants plaintiff would have increased its admission receipts,
less adjustments for film rental, to an amount equivalent to that received by the Wisconsin
Theatre during the period in which the illegal restraints continued." Transcript of Record,
p. 3348, Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561.
Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1952) 110 F. Supp. 398, also bases
an award of damages upon a comparison with a competing theater which, although not
owned by one of the defendants, did participate in the benefits from the conspiracy. The
case contains an exceptionally perceptive application of the Bigelow doctrine, and a most
thorough discussion of the evidence.

105 See note 15 supra.
106

See note 30 supra.
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backgrounds. 107 One of these, American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.,108 makes it clear that although Bigelow allows
damages to be measured by a comparison with plaintiff's prior earnings
which may have been affected by the conspiracy, where no better evidence is available, if there is evidence of earnings in a competitive
market, that evidence should be relied on rather than other data distorted by the illegal activities of the defendant. The evidence of price
in the Mandeville case which the defendant argued should be used as
the measure of damages was in most respects a much more accurate
indication of precisely what the plaintiff would have earned in the
absence of the conspiracy, but it was rejected by the court because it felt
that the Supreme Court's opinion in the first appeal' 0 9 had held this
evidence was affected by the defendant's illegal price fixing, to such an
extent as not to be a reliable indication of plaintiff's losses. Granted
the factual premise, the conclusion is sound, but the difficulty is that
the facts of the case do not seem to support the assertion that the fixing
107 For instance in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.

211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951), a district court judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court
without mention of damages, although a contention with regard to damages was made by
the defendants, in their Brief, p. 35. Proof of damages in that case was by testimony of
any accountant, showing the decline in plaintiff's sales, and an estimate of the decline
in profits during the period when plaintiff was deprived of defendants' products. As to one
of these products, plaintiff had no records, never having sold it, so that the testimony was
purely an estimate. Transcript of Record, pp. 121-138, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct. 259 (1951).
Two recent cases are concerned with proof of damages when the alleged violation
consists in a misuse of patents to restrain trade. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., (10th
Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 416, cert. den. 344 U.S. 837, affirmed a judgment that defendant's
attempts to monopolize the hydraulic oil pump market had caused the plaintiff to lose sales
of its pumps to the extent of six per month for the period involved. The evidence on which
this was based consisted of (1) facts showing the plaintiff's ability to make and sell the
pumps; (2) the relatively great efficiency and low price of plaintiff's pumps; (3) numerous
inquiries fom purchasers; (4) expert testimony as to the state of the market; (5) the sales
of comparable pumps by the defendant. Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Products Co., (D.C.
N.J. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 129, got the opposite result, where the evidence of loss consisted
chiefly of the testimony of the plaintiff's officers, and letters from potential customers. The
court did allow recovery of one specific sale's profit, which was elearly shown to have been
prevented by the defendant's wrongful activity.
The suggestion is made in William Goldman Theaters, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Pa.
1946) 69 F. Supp. 103 at 106, that the problem of estimating probable profits is much
simpler in the business of exhibiting motion pictures than in a manufacturing business,
because cost and prices can be predicted with much greater accuracy, the only variable being
volume.
108 (9th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 622, cert. den. 343 U.S. 957, 72 S.Ct. 1052 (1952).
10 9 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68 S.Ct.
996 (1948). The Supreme Court referred to "the interdependence and inextricable relationship between the interstate and intrastate effects of the combination," and said that
"In sum, the restraint and its monopolistic effects were reflected throughout each stage of
the industry, permeating the entire structure." 334 U.S. 219 at 241, 242, 68 S.Ct. 996
(1948).

19541

DAmAoGs i

ANTrIRUST Surrs

391

of beet prices had had any effect on the sugar prices which defendant
sought to use as a measure of damages. 110
There is at least one case outside the movie industry whose result
suggests that the courts might limit the application of Bigelow and
Milwaukee Towne to that industry, although of course there is no
language in either case to support such a limitation. Emich v. General
l l was a suit by a Chevrolet dealer against General
Motors Corporation'
Motors to recover for the cancellation of plaintiff's franchise which had
allegedly occurred as part of a conspiracy to force the plaintiff to finance
sales through the General Motors Acceptance Corporation. On the
damages issue the plaintiff offered evidence of the same general nature
approved by the Bigelow and Milwaukee Towne cases, consisting of
(1) a comparison with the business of other dealers, and (2) an attempt
to project past business and profits into the future so as to show the
prospective profits lost and the value of the good will of the business
which was destroyed. The jury verdict gave the plaintiff damages of
$350,000 which the district court trebled. This was reversed by the
circuit court of appeals partly on the ground that "the evidence submitted by plaintiffs as to the issue of damages was so extremely speculative and conjectural as to furnish no sound basis for the amount allowed."1 2 The court did not refer at all to the comparison with the
1l0 The price of beets paid to the plaintiffs was computed at approximately 50% of
the net price received by the defendant for sugar, after converting the weight of their beets
into their sugar content. The illegal activities of the defendant consisted in agreeing with
its two competitors to use the average net sugar price of the three of them as the basis
for computing the beet price, rather than the individual net price of each of them. This

was done in 1939, 1940 and 1941, and had the effect of fixing a uniform price for sugar
beets purchased from all growers in the northern California market. The plaintiffs urged
and the district courts adopted, as the measure of damages, the difference between what

plaintiffs had received for their beets in 1937 and 1938, and what they received in 1939,
1940 and 1941. Due to the method of figuring beet prices, this measure of damages was

ultimately based on the prices which the defendant received for sugar in 1937 and 1938.
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that its 1939 and 1940 and 1941 individual net sugar
prices should be used as the starting point for calculating damages, since they would show
exactly what plaintiffs had lost by the. price fixing conspiracy. Although there was almost
no evidence that the conspiracy aimed at fixing beet prices had affected the price of sugar,
and although the district court deliberately refused to find that it had, both district court
and court of appeals thought that the Supreme Court's holding required the conclusion
that the conspiracy had distorted sugar prices to such an extent as to disqualify them as
criteria of damages. This is a questionable application of the Supreme Court's decision in

view of the beet supply contracts used in this industry, as a result of which both growers
and sugar companies were directly interested in higher sugar prices, and sugar prices controlled beet prices. The evidence and findings of the district court are revealed by Transcript of Record, pp. 222, 266, 384-387, 694-697, 700, 718-720, 751, 759, 807, 810, American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc., (9th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 622.
111 (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70, reversed on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct.
408 (1951).
112 (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70 at 84.

392

MichIGAN LAw RnviEw

[Vol. 52

business of other dealers as a method of determining damages, the defendants having strongly argued that the other dealers were not shown
to be comparable." 8 As to profits lost before the franchise was cancelled, the court objected that the plaintiff had not furnished any
records to substantiate the testimony of its president, who said that his
figures on cars he could have sold, but did not because of the conspiracy,
were solely in "his mind and heart. 11 4 Estimates of prospective profits
lost, and of the value of good will of the business were given by an
accountant. The court objected that they represented his own views,
that he did not give his reasons for choosing the particular figures, and
gave no factual material to support his computations, so that their background appeared to be "very speculative and subjective. ' 1 5
In general the damage evidence in the Emich case was much like
that in the Bigelow case. In both cases the defendant was at the same
time a supplier and a competitor of the plaintiff, using its leverage as
supplier to win advantages as competitor. It was therefore plain in both
cases that the plaintiff had been deprived of any chance to operate in a
competitive market. In fact in the Emich case plaintiff was deprived
of its chance to operate altogether. In both cases the plaintiff compared
his earnings with those of competitors. In the Bigelow case a comparison was also made with earnings of the plaintiff for an earlier
113 Brief for Appellants, pp. 113-115, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
(7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70. The plaintiff put in some evidence that the physical
plants of the other two dealers were comparable to the plaintiff's, and also argued that the
Chevrolet franchises required the operations to be substantially the same. There was
evidence of the earnings of the allegedly comparable dealers both before and after deductions for income taxes and for compensation to their owners. Transcript of Record, pp.
1414-1453, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70.
114 (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70 at 84. The losses were alleged to have been
caused by defendant's failure to ship cars when ordered, and failure to ship the right models.
115 (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70 at 83. The accountant testified that he found
normal earnings from tangibles by taking 7h%of the value of those assets, and deducting
that figure from average actual earnings to get the earnings attributable to good will. This
figure was then capitalized at 10%, producing a value for good will of slightly over $100,000.
The defendant made many objections to this method, saying that the percentages chosen
were erroneous, that in using actual earnings the accountant failed to deduct the compensation paid to plaintiff's president, ivho was its sole stockholder, that the accountant
failed to deduct income taxes, and that the good will estimate duplicated the estimate for
prospective profits, so that there was a double recovery. Brief for Appellants, pp. 103-108,
98, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70. The
last objection at least seems to be well taken, since the good will figure capitalized future

profits as of 1936, the date when the dealership was cancelled, while the prospective profits
figure included amounts plaintiff would have earned from 1936 to date of suit in 1941, all
of which had been capitalized in the good will figure. The estimate of prospective profits
from 1936 to 1941 was based on the opinion of the plaintiff's president as to the number
of cars he would have sold, and the computations of the accountant as to expenses, profit
margins and total profits. Transcript of Record, pp. 1148, 1449, 1494-1503, Eanich Motors
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70.
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period. In the Emich case earnings of an earlier period were used to
give the profit margin on sales which allegedly would have been made
after cancellation, the volume of those sales being furnished by estimates of the plaintiff's president. Perhaps if the plaintiff's evidence
had merely indicated past sales, and sought to recover profits on an
equal volume in the future, the court might have approved, although
it would seem just as speculative to assume that volume would continue
at the same rate as to assume that it would increase. Both are merely
predictions, to be weighed by the trier of fact. In the Emich case the
actual sales for the later period could not be given, because the plaintiff
had been forced out of business by the alleged conspiracy, so that the
plaintiff necessarily had to make estimates. The best explanation for
the case probably is that the court felt that the estimates made were not
properly supported by the books and documents of the plaintiff and
by an account of the calculations from which the ultimate figures were
reached. If so, then the case does not rule out estimates of the kind
given, but merely holds that such estimates must be based on more
adequate facts, which is to say that the best evidence of the facts available was not produced. On the other hand the case could very well
be construed to amount to a refusal to follow Bigelow's line of reasoning
that this is just a question of causation, a matter of fact as to which the
trier's decision supported by adequate evidence is to be accepted.
III.

Recovery of Profits Lost by Reason of Robinson-Patman Act
Violations

The difficulties of proving damages where the plaintiff is alleging
a violation of the Sherman Act are compounded when the alleged
illegality consists of a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.:16 In the
first situation the plaintiff must prove that a conspiracy or monopoly
caused him to lose business, by cutting off his supplies, or by driving
the price down, or by preventing him from getting first run films. In
the second, he must prove that he lost business as a result of the defendant's giving benefits to his competitors, in the form of more favorable prices or terms. A comparison of plaintiff's earnings with those
of a competitor, or with his own earnings before the violation may be
fairly persuasive to show how much business he lost by reason of a
Sherman Act violation. The same sort of comparison is much less
persuasive in the Robinson-Patman Act case.
11649 Stat. L. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946)

§13a.
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One might draw an analogy to a footrace in which there are many
runners. It is reasonably plain that when X knocks A down, he destroys whatever chance A had of winning the race. It is not nearly so
clear that when X furnishes an unfair advantage to B, another runner,
he has destroyed A's chances for success, especially if B does not win
either. In all such instances the injury, precisely defined, is the same,
and consists in depriving the plaintiff of his chance to compete in a race
or in a market operated in accordance with the rules, or, as some of the
cases say, a market which is freely competitive. But if the money value
of that chance is measured by estimating what the plaintiff would have
earned in such a market, that estimate can be made with a much lower
degree of probability in Robinson-Patman Act cases because the competitive relationship is affected only as between the plaintiff and one or
two competitors, while as between the plaintiff and all others, the relationship is not affected.
Two recent cases, American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning
Co., "' and American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices,"" illustrate the problem and reach opposite conclusions. In the first case, the plaintiff was
a small Arkansas canner of vegetables, who bought from the defendant
all the cans it used. The alleged violations of the Robinson-Patman
Act consisted of discriminatory freight equalization, improper price
allowances to an Indiana canner, and the defendant's system of quantity
discounts to large purchasers. The only element of damages which
concerns this discussion is plaintiff's claim that the defendant's discriminatory practices impaired its competitive position." 9 The district
court, citing Story and Bigelow, found a large decline in plaintiff's
business from the peak year of 1944 to the point where it showed a net
loss for 1947.2° Plaintiff's can purchases showed a similar decline.
On the other hand, those of plaintiff's competitors who benefited from
the discriminations in various ways did not show such a loss of business.
The national competitors got a larger and larger share of the national
market at the expense of the smaller canners. The district court then
held that although many factors may have affected plaintiff's business
and that of its competitors, the defendant's trade practices alone were
117 (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38. The case in the lower court is Russellville
Canning Co. v. American Can Co., (D.C. Ark. 1949) 89 F. Supp. 484.
118 (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 919, rehearing den. (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d)
73, petition for certiorari dismissed on motion of counsel for petitioner, 342 U.S. 875, 72
S.Ct. 165 (1951).

The case is reported below as Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.,

(D.C. Fla. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 985.

119 The rather closely connected problem of allowing recovery of the amount of the

discrimination, so-called general damages, will be discussed below. See p. 406 infra.
120

(D.C. Ark. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 484 at 501.
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common to all, and therefore the evidence was "legally sufficient to
enable the court to make a just and reasonable estimate of the damages
incurred by plaintiff."'21 This was reversed by the court of appeals
which found that "there were too many factors bearing upon the decline
in the plaintiffs earning power to justify blaming it upon the trade
practices of the defendant.' 122 Some of these factors were the illness
of plaintiff's most active manager, climatic conditions, crop failure and
the change over after the war from a noncompetitive to a competitive
market. There was apparently no evidence in the case to show how
the defendant's discriminatory practices were connected with the plaintiffs loss of business, such as, for example, evidence that plaintiff's
prices were higher than those of its competitors because of the discrimination. If in fact the discriminatory pricing did cause the plaintiff to
lose business, it would seem that this would have been reflected in the
price which plaintiff had to charge in order to cover costs, and that
plaintiff could show that the discrimination caused its costs to be higher
than those of its favored competitors.
The Bruce's Juices case' 2 3 upheld an award of damages on evidence somewhat similar to that in the Russellville case. Plaintiff, a
canner of citrus juices, with its principal cannery located at Tampa,
Florida, bought all its cans from the defendant. The alleged discriminations consisted of quantity discounts to large customers, a "runway"
price discount to an Indiana canner, and a secret low price on a certain
type of can to one of plaintiff's competitors. The district court found
the following elements of damage to be proved: (1) The amount of the
discounts themselves could be recovered, without further proof. The
court called this "general" damage, as distinguished from "special" damage. The problems raised by this award will be discussed below.' 24 (2)
Plaintiff's business did not grow to the same extent as the Florida citrus
industry generally. (3) Plaintiff's sales of grocery size cans declined
after the discriminations. (4) The plaintiff's lost sales before 1942
caused its tinplate quota, set by government regulation during the war,
to be less as to certain juices than it would otherwise have been in 1942.
(5) Plaintiff's good will, the public favor of its name, trade-mark and
product, were damaged. The district court was unable to separate the
various items of damage, or to value them individually, partly because
there was an "overlapping" among them. It merely found that the
2
3 1 Id.

at 503.
(8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38 at 60.
=See note 118 supra.
12
1 See p. 406 infra.
122

396

MICHIGAN LAW lrvmw

-

[ Vol. 52

total damages equalled $60,000 after the overlap was eliminated. The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment, without discussion of the question of damages, except to say, 'We have carefully reviewed the action
of the district court in awarding damages in this case, and have reached
the conclusion that the judgment rendered is fully in accord with the
principles enunciated in the applicable authorities."'' 5
There was apparently no evidence in the case as to the extent of
injury to good will, except the testimony of the plaintiff's president that
it had been injured.'26 On the other points there was evidence of the
increase in the total industry pack of Florida citrus juices, as compared
with a decline in plaintiff's pack from a high point in 1937-1938,127
and evidence that plaintiff's sales of a special small size of canned juice
fell off markedly in various areas of the country during the period in
question,
due, in the opinion of plaintiff's president, to the competition of the canners who were favored by the defendant's discriminatory price system. There was also evidence of the gross profit on the
small cans, 2 9 and of price-cutting by the favored competitor which
forced the plaintiff to lower its price.130 No such showing was made
on losses of sales of other kinds of cans.
The defendant's arguments were to the effect that the evidence did
not show that plaintiff lost sales to the favored competitors, that the
discrimination did not explain the decline in sales because it continued
before and after the decline, and in fact the discrimination in pricing
was greater when the plaintiff was having its best year.' 3 The defendant also argued that most members of the Florida citrus industry
were in the same situation as the plaintiff, in not receiving the price
discounts, so that proof that the industry sales increased while plaintiff's
did not indicated nothing about the causes of increase, the comparison
being substantially between non-favored canners.' 2 The defendant
finally attempted to show that plaintiff did not compete with the favored
canners, either because they sold in different geographical areas, or
because they sold through different outlets.'
125 (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 919 at 924.

126 Transcript of Record, p. 353, American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, (5th Cir. 1951)
187 F. (2d) 919.
127 Id., pp. 314-321, 1593-1596, 268, 269.
128 Id., pp. 228-253.
129Id., pp. 367, 368, 631-634.
130 Id., pp. 196-198.
131 Brief for Appellant, pp. 93, 94, American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, (5th Cir.
1951) 187 F. (2d) 919.
182 Id., pp. 92, 93.
133 Id.,

pp. 96-101.
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The Russellville and Bruce's Juices cases seem to be in conflict at
least in their attitudes on the extent to which the plaintiff is required
to show that his loss was the favored competitor's gain. It may be
possible to distinguish the two cases on the basis of the evidence offered,
since in Bruce's Juices the plaintiff was able to show that some competitors were enabled to cut prices by the discount, that one competitor
received other competitive advantages, and that while plaintiff's business was declining, the business of two of the favored competitors was
increasing somewhat, while in the Russellville case the plaintiff was
apparently not so specific.
Neither case, however, attempts to make any general statements
about requirements of proof. A tentative generalization which the two
cases might support is that in cases based on price discrimination the
plaintiff cannot prove his damages merely by showing that he lost business during the period of the discrimination, but he must also show
that the competitors who received the illegal discount increased their
business, and perhaps that the discount gave them specific advantages,
such as the ability to cut prices or to spend more on advertising or on
purchasing than the plaintiff. If the movie cases were relied upon, they
would seem to justify a comparison of the plaintiff's business with that
of the favored competitor, provided there could be at least some testimony as to the effect of the price discrimination on selling prices, and
provided that the businesses were in other respects comparable. A
comparison of the plaintiffs business before and after the discrimination also would be persuasive, but probably would not be feasible, as it
was not in the Bruce's Juices case, where the discrimination had apparently been going on for the entire period of the plaintiffs existence.
IV.

Recovery for Exclusion From Business

The cases to be discussed in this section are much like those in the
preceding sections, the difference being that they deal with the problem
which is presented when the plaintiff has never been actively in business at all, but contends that his entry into the business was foreclosed
by the illegal activities of the defendant. In these cases the plaintiff
thus has no prior record of operations to use as a yardstick for his recovery.
The first problem which arises is whether the plaintiff is a member
of the class of persons given a cause of action by the antitrust laws, that
is, whether he has been injured "in his business or property."13 4 The
1s4 26 Stat. L. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §15.
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argument is sometimes made that if the plaintiff has not actually entered
the business, he is not given any right to recover for violations, and is
in no different position from any member of the general public. It is
reasonably clear that a plaintiff who has done no more than to think
of going into a business which is dominated by a monopolistic firm, or
by a combination in restraint of trade, may not recover on a claim that
he was prevented from going further by the violation of the antitrust
laws. 135 On the other hand, it is equally clear that the courts do not
require that he must be actively operating the business before he may
recover. 186 At least some protection is given his right of entry. The
inquiry is thus resolved into one of determining whether the plaintiff
had such intention and means as to make his entry into the business
probable, in the absence of interference from the defendants. This
would ordinarily depend on what the plaintiff's conduct had been up
to the time of suit, whether he had taken affirmative steps to go into
business, whether he had the means for going on, and what his experience was in the business, what financing he had, and similar facts

135 Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., (D.C. Ark. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 312. Here the

plaintiff had entered into negotiations for the purchase of a movie theater, which the
defendants then sold to someone else, allegedly as part of a conspiracy to prevent the independent operation of the theater by the plaintiff. In dismissing the complaint, the court

said, (D.C. Ark. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 312 at 316, 317: "Giving to the complaint the most
favorable construction in favor of the statement of a cause of action it merely reveals that
the plaintiff desired to buy the property but did not complete his negotiations for it and
that it was sold by one of the defendants to another of the defendants before he succeeded
in acquiring any rights in regard to or interest in the property.....

the failure of his

negotiations for the purchase of the theatre did not injure him in his business or property
any more than it may have injured any member of the general public who might have been
desirous of buying the property. If the plaintiff can maintain this suit merely because he
desired to buy the property and was unable to persuade the owner to sell him the property,
then it would be possible for any citizen to maintain a similar suit who had discussed in
any manner with any owner or his agent the possibility of buying a building suitable for
the operation of a theater, and that would be true regardless of the prior business or lack
of business that the person was engaged in at the time he had the idea that he would like
to purchase property and enter the show business."
136 Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., (2d Cir. 1908)
166 F. 254, reversed the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that the plaintiff, a sugar
importer and refiner who had stopped business during the Spanish-American War, had
built a new plant and wished to resume operations but was prevented from doing so by
the defendant's illegal conduct. The court said that even if plaintiff was unable to prove
substantial compensatory damages, it might get nominal damages.
See also American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, (4th Cir. 1950) 183 F.
(2d) 869, reversing (D.C. Va. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 12, which held that summary judgment
for the defendants was improperly granted where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants

had combined to exclude the plaintiff from selling time in the local tobacco market.
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indicating that the plaintiff would and could have begun his operations
but for the defendant's illegal conduct."'
There is one other hurdle for the plaintiff which, however, is probably no longer of any importance. There is some indication in an early
case by Justice Holmes to the effect that a plaintiff who enters business
at a time when the defendant has already become a monopolizer, or has
already set up a restraint of interstate trade, is in some manner to be
given less consideration than a plaintiff who was actually in business
while the defendant's influence was being developed and was injured
in the course of that development1.' 8 The least that can be said for
this dictum is that it furnishes incentive for the monopolist to work
fast, in order to forestall competition. It seems clearly inconsistent with
the entire line of cases which allow recovery for exclusion from trade.
Once the plaintiff has established his intention and readiness to
enter a given business, and has proved that he was prevented from
doing so by the defendant's illegal conduct, he then has the difficult
task of proving the extent to which he has been damaged by the exclusion. Of course under the traditional damages rules he could not
recover substantial damages because he could not put in evidence an
earnings record for an established business. It is here, however, that
the recent movie cases are extremely important, since they allow a comparison with a competitor's earnings, even though those earnings may
be distorted by membership in an illegal combination.
The leading case is William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc.'39 The plaintiff in that case got a ten-year lease on the Erlanger
Theatre in Philadelphia, with the intention of entering the first-run
business in that city. At that time all other first-run theaters in the city
were owned or operated by a subsidiary of Warner Brothers, and plaintiff was completely unable to lease any first-run films for his theater.
The circuit court of appeals, on appeal from the first trial, had held
that an unlawful conspiracy existed between the defendants, the major
137 In Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., Inc. v. National Electric Products Corp., (3d
Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 398, the defendanes summary judgment was affirmed when it
appeared plaintiff could scarcely fill its own requirements, and was entirely unable to sell
the product in the market. A similar case is Pastor v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1940) 76 F. Supp. 781.
138Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 at 63, 39 S.Ct. 38
(1918).
139 (D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 103, affd. on the opinion of the district court, (3d
Cir. 1948) 164 F. (2d) 1021, cert. den. 334 U.S. 811, 68 S.Ct. 1016 (1948).
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national producers and distributors of films and their subsidiaries, to
exclude the plaintiff from the first-run business. 4 ° The plaintiff was
never able to show pictures regularly in the Erlanger, although it did
receive some income fr6m the theater which was not enough to cover
its out-of-pocket expenses.
The plaintiff claimed damages over the period from September 1,
1941 to December 8, 1942, consisting of its out-of-pocket expenses and
the profits which it allegedly would have made if it could have operated
the Erlanger as a first-run theater. The evidence on the expenses was
of course clear. So far as profits were concerned the plaintiff was, as
the district court pointed out, in as strong a position as anyone could
be who had not actually started in business, 4 ' since it had been operating a chain of second-run houses in the Philadelphia area for some
time with great success. Its sole stockholder was an experienced theater
operator who had been employed by Warner Brothers at one time as
general manager for Philadelphia. 42 It was therefore plain that plaintiff had the intention arid capacity to operate the business if given a
chance.
The plaintiff was also able to present convincing evidence that its
theater was suitable in size, appointments, location, equipment and
reputation for the showing of first-run pictures, although it was smaller
than most of the Warner theaters, and had no air-conditioning equipment.
As a measure of profits lost, the plaintiff put in evidence of the
total earnings of the five existing first-run theaters in Philadelphia, less
their total expenses. Plaintiff then divided this figure by five and contended that this average net earning figure, which came to $302,560.94,
over the period in question, was a fair indication of what the Erlanger
would have earned if it had been able to get first-run films. 43 Plaintiff
also put in evidence the net earnings of the Warner Mastbaum Theatre,
140 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (3d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 738.
The court's only reference to the question of damages was to say that the plaintiff had
dearly suffered loss, but that there was no way of knowing the extent of that loss. It
remanded for inquiry as to damages.
'41
(D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 103 at 106: "Turning now to the facts of the
present case, it appears that the plaintiff was about as close to having an established business
at the Erlanger as it could be without actually having one."
142 In this respect the case is like that of the Buckeye Powder case, 248 U.S. 55, 39
S.Ct. 38 (1918), where the Supreme Court intimated that the plaintiff had resigned from

DuPont and set up his own business just for the purpose of suing the DuPont for violating

the Sherman Act.
143 Brief for Appellee, pp. 34, 41, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 1948) 164 F. (2d) 1021.
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which was only in operation from September 4, 1942 on. The Mastbaum was more than twice as large as the Erlanger, though found by
the district
court to be otherwise comparable, and was located very close
4
to it.

14

The defendants made the familiar arguments that the Erlanger had
never made a profit, and that under those conditions the plaintiff had
failed to prove its damages, relying on the older rules of damages and
contending that Bigelow had not changed those rules. 14' Defendants
produced expert testimony to the effect that the Erlanger's drawing
power was from 33 1/3 percent to 65 percent less than that of the
Warner theaters, and that the Erlanger's gross would have been less
than half of the average gross revenue of the Warner theaters, which
would have resulted in a net loss. 46 The defendants also argued that
the playing of pictures for longer runs, as would be necessary with six,
instead of five, theaters competing, would reduce the earnings of all
six; that the Mastbaum earnings were not admissible because inflated
by the war boom; and that the plaintiff had completely failed to prove
that in a freely competitive situation it would have been able to lease
any first-run pictures. 4 '
In .its opinion the district court refused to award the plaintiff its
out-of-pocket expenses, on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
an award of profits, and that the two claims were based on distinct and
mutually exclusive theories of recovery. This would seem to be erroneous. If the theory of damages is to place the plaintiff, as nearly as
possible, in the same position he would have been in if the defendants
had not wronged him, then he ought to recover his expenses as well as.
his profits. If the plaintiff in this case had been able to get first-run
pictures, it would have had all its expenses paid, plus the profits. As it
was, it not only had no profits, but it had to pay theater rent and upkeep,
in excess of what little income it could get from the theater. Its theories
of recovery were therefore not mutually exclusive. A similar situation
arises in actions for breach of contract where there has been part per'44 (D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 103 at 107.
145 Brief of Distributor Defendants, pp. 78-82, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., (3d Cir. 1948) 164 F. (2d) 1021.
146 Id., pp. 69, 71.
147d., pp. 71, 68, 67. The defendants later, after the final judgment in the case,
attempted to get a bill of review in the district court, alleging that after losing the case
defendants had offered Goldman first-run films, but that Goldman had used them in other
theaters than the Erlanger. The defendants argued that this proved that the Erlanger was
not suitable for first-run exhibition. The court rejected all contentions. William Goldman
Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (3d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 241.
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formance by the plaintiff, and where he is allowed to recover the cost
of the part performance plus his net profit on the entire contract. 4 '

The district court also held that the plaintiff was not barred by its
failure to show second-run pictures in the Erlanger Theatre, thereby
minimizing the loss, since that would have involved entering and
carrying on a business quite different from that which it intended. 4
This result seems fair, although if the expenditure of a relatively small
sum would prevent a much larger loss, some cases would require the
plaintiff to make the expenditure on pain of failing to recover the larger
50

sum.
On the main issue the district court rejected the contention that
recovery could be given only where the injury was done to an established business, and said that although the plaintiff must produce all
the evidence he can, when the circumstances are such that accurate
data cannot be given, the standard of proof will be lowered. It then
allowed a recovery of $125,000, saying that it considered both the evidence of the average profits of defendants' theaters, and the profits of
defendants' Mastbaum, but discounted them for the Erlanger's inferior
location, equipment, expenses and the fa& that the Mastbaum earnings

were inflated by the war.
This case has great significance since it is such a clear-cut decision
that there can be recovery for exclusion, even though the proof of profits
is open to all sorts of logical objections. It stands directly in the line
of cases liberalizing the rules of damages. Of course later cases may
very well be distinguished on their facts since few of them will be as
favorable to the plaintiff's claims as the Goldman case.
Proof that the Goldman case is not a fluke, if any is needed, can be
found in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre
Corp.," ' which upheld a much larger recovery under similar circumstances. In this case the conspiracy of the defendants forced the plainCorTRAcTs, rev. ed., 1363 (1937); McConaucx, DAMAGEs 582,
148 5 WmsoN,
585 (1935).
149 Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 S.Ct. 307 (1904), held that the plaintiffs
were not required to join the defendants' illegal association as a means of minimizing
damages.
150 1n Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, (1st Cir. 1948) 172 F. (2d) 37, the
court said that the plaintiff could not recover several hundred thousand dollars where he
could have prevented the loss by paying $10,000 in illegal arbitration claims exacted by the
defendants.
151 (8th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 846, cert. den. 343 U.S. 942, 72 S.Ct. 1035 (1952).
A jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $375,000 was affirmed.
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tiff to sell its long lease on a theater to a corporation controlled by the
defendants. The jury was allowed to consider evidence of the net
profits which the defendants' corporation made from the theater over
the period, and returned a verdict which clearly showed it had taken
those profits as the measure of damages. This case in effect reaches
the result contended for by Mr. McConnell, 12 since here the measure
of plaintiff's damages is exactly the same as the amount of the defendants' profits from the conspiracy. The court does not purport to
adopt the profits theory of recovery, however, but merely indicates that
the defendants' profits are a reasonable basis for estimating the plaintiffs loss on these rather unusual facts. Oddly enough it does not cite
the Goldman case, although the only differences between the two cases
are that the plaintiff in Brookside may have operated its theater for a
very short time, and that it had the profits of the theater available for
use as a measure of damages, thereby avoiding some of the uncertainty
inherent in the Goldman facts. The plaintiff in the Brookside case
made this possible by waiting from 1937 until 1949 to sue, the statute
of limitations being suspended during the pendency
of the Paramount
1 4
case 15" under section 5 of the Clayton Act.
The Goldman and Brookside cases give damages for exclusion from
business where a similar competing business is available for comparison.
The Brookside case in fact is based upon even more reliable evidence
as to the earnings, in the hands of the defendant, of the very business
from which the plaintiff was excluded. If, however, the plaintiff were
prevented from entering a manufacturing business whose novelty permitted of no comparison with existing firms, his task would be more
difficult. It is just in that situation that his exclusion would cause the
most social harm, one often repeated justification for the so-called competitive system being its incitement to industrial progress. The Bigelow
doctrine as interpreted in this paper seems to support a recovery in this
hypothetical case if based on the best available evidence, such as expert
testimony about the plaintiff's prospects in the market, or evidence of
the opinions of investors as shown in the financing of the venture. In
view of the conservatism of lower courts in these cases, however, a
clearcut prediction that such a plaintiff could get a judgment for substantial damages would be rash to say the least.
152 See note 84 supra.
153 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
154 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946)

334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
§16.
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V. Recovery of Buyers for Illegal Pricing by Sellers
Although pricing practices which violate the antitrust laws may
produce claims of loss of profits, as in the Russellville and Bruce'sJuices
cases,"'s the discussion in this section does not deal with those claims,
but with attempts to recover the price increase or price discrimination
as such, without proof of lost profits.
Two questions arise out of these attempts on the part of buyers to
recover price differences from their suppliers: (1) Where the plaintiff
sues for an illegal price increase, must he prove not only that the price
increase was the result of illegal conduct, but also that he was not able
to pass the increase on to his own customers? (2) Where the claim is
that the defendant discriminated in price between the plaintiff and
plaintiff's competitors, may the plaintiff recover the amount of the discrimination without further proof of damage to his business?
A. Damages For Price Increases. To take up the first question
first, it appears to be settled that if the plaintiff is a consumer of the
goods or services for which he is forced to pay an inflated price by an
illegal combination or monopoly, he may recover the amount of the
difference between a "reasonable" price and the actual price multiplied
by the volume of goods purchased.'
In general the courts seem not
to have gone into whether the plaintiff might pass the higher prices
along to his customers, where the plaintiff consumed the goods or
services, as distinguished from reselling them. One case does intimate
that the plaintiff must show not only that prices were unreasonably high,
but also that if they were lower, plaintiff would be better off than its
competitors in some way, on the theory that if the prices were lower for
plaintiff, they would be for his competitors in most instances, and the
plaintiff would be no better off than before. 57 This requirement would
seem to put such a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff as to prevent
him from ever being able to recover for illegal prices, except where he
155 See notes 117 and 118 supra.

15 6 Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 27 S.Ct. 65
(1906). The plaintiff here did not buy from the defendant, but from another member of
the conspiracy. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 37 S.Ct. 353 (1917), contains a dictum
that the excess over a reasonable rate may be recovered. See Ring v. Spina, (2d Cir. 1945)
148 F.5 7(2d) 647 at 653.
'
Keogh v. Chicago & N. R. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47 (1922). Cf. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 38 S.Ct. 186 (1918), not an
antitrust case, where the plaintiff was allowed to recover excessive railroad rates even though
it appeared that the plaintiff, a shipper, passed on the rate expenses to its customers. Holmes

there said, "The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go
beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences to a defendant, so it

holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss." 245 U.S. 531 at 533, 38
S.Ct. 186 (1918).
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could show lost profits, and it also overlooks the fact that plaintiff and
all his competitors might be able to expand their sales if they could offer
lower prices themselves, in a situation where the demand curve for the
industry was more or less elastic.
It is equally well settled that a dealer in the articles on which the
price is illegally raised may recover the excess of the price over a freely
competitive price where the dealer's own selling price is held down by
competitive or other forces. The usual case of this kind occurs when
a retailer who refuses to observe the manufacturer's suggested prices is
denied the regular dealer's discount, and has to pay the full retail
price."' In such cases it is clear that the dealer should get the difference in price, since that will measure quite exactly the losses of
profits he has suffered by being deprived of the discount. Lost profits
and price difference should then be equal.
Of course in these cases the plaintiff must prove with reasonable
would have been in the absence
probability what the price of the goods
59
of the combination or monopoly.'
Where the plaintiff buys the goods for resale, however, several
cases hold that he may not recover for an illegally high price in the
absence of proof that his margin of profit was reduced by that high
price."' Though some of these cases seem to stand for the broad rule
that illegal prices are not recoverable as such,' 6 ' their facts will not
support such a rule. A business may suffer loss either through decline
in sales volume or selling price on the one hand, or by an increase in
costs on the other. Prices illegally increased, as in the oil cases, cause
loss by increasing costs. If selling prices are not raised, clearly the
illegal cost price will produce a loss in the amount of the illegal increase,
as in the Strauscase.'62 If selling prices go up as a result of the increase
in costs, it is equally clear that no loss occurs, except so far as the entire
industry may lose in volume. This is what occurred in the oil cases, 163
15 8 Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1924) 297 F. 791; Montague &
Co. v. Lowry, (9th Cir. 1902) 115 F. 27, affd. 193 U.S. 38, 24 S.Ct. 307 (1904); Frey &
Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., (D.C. Md. 1917) 243 F. 205.
159 Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of C., A. and P., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80
F. Supp. 888; American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, (2d Cir. 1915) 229 F. 77.
160

Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 580, cert.

den. 326 U.S. 734, 66 S.Ct. 42 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
(7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 967, cert. den. 321 U.S. 792, 64 S.Ct. 790 (1944); Twin

Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., (8th Cir. 1941) 119 F. (2d) 747, cert. den. 314 U.S. 644,
62 S.Ct. 84 (1941); Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuumr Oil Co., (D.C. Iowa 1943)
51 F. Supp. 440; Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (D.C. Wis. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 369.
1 1
6 See Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d)
967 at
1 62971.

See note 158 supra.

16l See note 160 supra.
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where the plaintiffs' own evidence showed that their margin of profit

remained the same even after the increase in cost prices. The question
then is what will be the result if there is no evidence at all on the movement of plaintiff's selling prices. This is really a matter of imposing the
burden of producing evidence. There are dicta in the oil cases which
seem to indicate that the burden is on the plaintiff, so that if he proves
only that his cost prices were illegally increased by the defendants'
conduct, without showing how his selling prices reacted, he would get
no damages. If, on the other hand, he proves both that his cost prices
increased and that his selling prices did not, he may recover.' 64 This
would seem to be a workable result, since the plaintiff would be in a
better position to give evidence about his own selling'prices than the
defendant.
The net result of the foregoing cases then is that to prove his damages the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant illegally increased
the price of plaintiffs supplies, and (2) plaintiff's selling price did not
then rise enough to compensate for the rise in costs. Presumably the
decline in total industry volume as a result of a general price increase
could not be measured accurately enough to be a factor. At any rate
no case seems to consider it.
B. Damages For Price Discrimination. Price discrimination under the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts' 65 differs from the price
increases described in the foregoing cases in that the plaintiff's cost
prices are not raised, but one or more of his competitor's prices are reduced, although in some situations the two forms of illegality will be
quite similar. For example the Straus case might be called one of
discrimination since the plaintiff paid a higher price than his competitors. The distinction is that in the Straus case it is clear that without the illegality all parties would pay the lower, wholesale price,
whereas in the usual case of illegal discounts it is probable that without
the illegal pricing all parties would not pay the lower price, but would
pay either the higher price, or perhaps some intermediate price.
The problem then is whether the plaintiff may recover the amount
by which his price differs from that of the favored competitor, multiplied by the volume of purchases made by plaintiff from the defendant.
The early drafts of the Robinson-Patman Act contained a specific provision allowing this measure of damages in the absence of proof of other
damages, but this provision was removed by the conference committee
164 See McCain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (D.C. Mo. 1945) 64 F. Supp. 12.
165 38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 49 Stat. L. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13.
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of the two houses of Congress. 6 ' This is of course persuasive evidence
that the amount of discrimination was not intended to be, ipso facto,
the measure of damages, although it is possible that the members of the
committee thought that the same result would be reached under ordinary rules of damages so that there was no need for the special
provision.
The authorities are clearly in conflict on the question. In favor
of the amount of discrimination as the measure of damages are Justice
Jackson's dictum in the first Bruce's Juices case,"' the Gus Blass case, 6 '
and the second Bruce's Juices case,' 69 although the latter is not entirely
of damages are
specific on the point. Cases which oppose this method
7
70
1
Cosmetic.'
Sun
and
seems,
it
Russellville,' or so
The Russellville case is doubtful on this point, since it purports not
to overrule Gus Blass, an earlier case in the same circuit. It goes on to
say that although ordinarily "where a seller is guilty of unlawful discrimination in prices between customers, the amount of the price
difference is the measure of damages . . . ,"1' that is not true in the
Russellv'ille situation because there all canners were benefited by the
equalization of freight on Fort Smith, Arkansas, which was the alleged
discrimination, and the plaintiff's only complaint was that it did not
receive as great a benefit as its competitors. Yet that is precisely the
claim made in most price discrimination cases. What the court seems
to be arguing is that the discrimination benefited the plaintiff in comparison to its competitors located outside Arkansas, even though it
1'6 The Senate report on the Robinson Bill stated that it included a presumptive rule
for the measure of damages as a deterrent to violators, and as a means for enabling victims
of discriminations to avoid the great difficulties of proving loss of business. The proposed
section reads as follows: "(d) For purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the measure
of damages for any violation of this section shall, where the fact of damage is shown, and
in the absence of proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the pecuniary amount or
equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, payment, or grant involved .... " S. Rep. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 2, 8 (1936). The conference report deleting this section read:
"Subsection (e) of the Senate bill set up a new measure of damages for violations of the
law, whereas the House bill left the damages to be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the existing Clayton Act. The Senate receded." H. Rep. 2951, 74th Cong.,
2d sess. 8 (1936).
167 "If the prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, at least in the amount of that discrimination."
Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 at 757, 67 S.Ct. 1015 (1947).
16SElizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988,
cert. den. 326 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 230 (1945).
169 See note 118 supra.
'70 See note 117 supra.
71
1 Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., (2d Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d)
150.
172 (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 38 at 55.

408

MicmGA

LAw RE E[w

[ Vol. 52

damaged plaintiff as compared with its other competitors who had
plants at Fort Smith. The plaintiff was thus in a position much like
that of a buyer who comes within an intermediate classification on an
illegal discount schedule. He does not get as large a discount as some
of his competitors, but he does get a larger one than others.
A simple illustration may perhaps throw light on this issue. Suppose, as may have been the case in Gus Blass, that there are only two
,competing firms selling an article in the market, the plaintiff and X,
and that both buy from the defendant. Suppose their costs total $1
per unit, and that they both sell for $1.25. If the defendant then gives
X an illegal discount of $.25 per unit, X will be able to make double
the profit the plaintiff makes if the selling price remains the same.
Assuming that plaintiff cannot prove that he lost any business to X,
at that point plaintiff has suffered no damages in one sense, that is, he
is making no less of a profit than he was before. In another sense, he
has suffered damage, however, since he is no longer making a profit
equal to his competitor's, as he would be if the market were not affected
by the defendant's violation. This may be a matter of some importance
to the plaintiff, since it may enable X to become much stronger than
the plaintiff financially, so that in a later competitive trial of strength
X would stand a better chance of winning. If the purpose of awarding
damages is to place the plaintiff as nearly as possible in as good'a financial position as he occupied before the injury, the court has two alternatives: (1) If it compares the plaintiff's earnings with his earnings over
an earlier period, as in the Bigelow case, it will find that he has suffered
no damage. (2) If it compares plaintiffs cost prices with those of his
competitor, however, it will find that the plaintiff's position has changed
for the worse. A convenient way to measure this change in dollars is
by the amount of the price concession to the competitor, although it
may well be that by superior efficiency or other means the plaintiff
could continue successfully to compete in the market. This analysis
is equally applicable notwithstanding the fact that the defendant would
not have given the plaintiff the lower price.
The Gus Blass case and Justice Jackson 7 ' seem to have adopted the
second alternative without much discussion of its implications. On the
facts of the Gus Blass case that result seems correct, since, so far as
appears, plaintiff had only one comparable competitor for the market,
which consisted of the retail sales of defendant's cosmetics in Little
Rock, Arkansas. The limited nature of the market and the fewness of
competitors make the plaintiffs damages plain.
1

73

See notes 167, 168 supra.
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Where the market is geographically larger, and there are many
sellers, only one or two of whom receive price concessions, as in the
Russellville case, there would be more reason to choose the first alternafive, and to hold that the price difference is not ipso facto the measure
of damages. For one thing, the plaintiff and the favored competitor
would probably compete for only a fraction of the plaintiff's sales. It
would therefore be very difficult to determine to what extent plaintiff's
ability to compete had been affected by the illegal price discount, since
he would still be operating on equal terms with all other competitors.
His injury, precisely defined, would consist in not being on equal
terms with the favored competitor to the extent of that fraction of the
business done in the market where they both sold. The extreme difficulty of proving the extent of competition here would often justify a
refusal to compute the damages in this way. Similarly if the plaintiff
and the favored competitors sold different articles, as was true in the
Russellville case, 4 the plaintiff's injury would be definable as no
longer being on equal terms with the comuetitor, to the extent that
their products competed for the buyer's dollar. But, as the dissent in
that case pointed out, 7 5 it was nearly impossible to say to what extent

a buyer would consider the plaintiff's spinach and beans an alternative
for the favored competitor's different vegetables, so that it would also
be impossible to say how much of plaintiff's business was affected by
the discrimination. If only a small, or indeterminate part was affected,
then it would be entirely unjustified to allow the plaintiff to recover
the price difference on all cans purchased from the defendant.
The case is even plainer when the plaintiff is in an intermediate
position in the discriminatory price system, better off than some competitors and worse off than others in the -prices he receives from the
defendant. If he is allowed to recover the difference between the price
he paid and that of his most favored competitor, the advantage which
he himself received from the illegal price system is not taken into
account. That advantage might often be great enough to offset his
losses. Presumably that was what the majority thought had occurred in
Russellville. In such a situation the plaintiff is properly left to recover
only such of his losses as he can prove were the result of the discrimination, without the aid of the "general" damage rule.
The use of the price difference as the measure of damages is, therefore, a specific application of the more general finding, required for
174 See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., C8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d)
38 at 50.
175 Id., p. 62.
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liability in Robinson-Patman cases, that the effect of the price discrimination "may be substantially to lessen competition . . 176 While
liability may result from evidence showing no more than that the
discrimination was large enough to influence resale price, 7 ' the amount
of the discrimination can only be the measure of damages where the
difference in price can be related to the impairment of the plaintiff's
competitive position, to his ability to compete with the favored competitor. If the evidence does not show the extent to which that ability was
impaired by the discrimination, then the damages must be computed
in some other way, and be based on some other evidence, even though
the evidence was sufficient to show a "lessening of competition" which
would support a finding of liability.
The Bruce's Juices case raises the question whether both kinds of
damages, lost profits and price difference, can be awarded in the same
case. That case did give them both, without, however, revealing its
method of computation, thereby leading one to suspect that the figure
awarded was the product of pure fiat. If the foregoing analysis of the
conditions under which damages are given in these cases is correct,
both measures of damage should not be applied in the same case and
Bruce's Juices was wrongly decided. When the plaintiff is given the
profits he would have made but for the defendant's illegal price discrimination, he is made whole. If the court then goes on to award the
amount of the discrimination, multiplied by the volume of plaintiff's
purchases from the defendant, the plaintiff ends up with more money
in his treasury than if there had been no illegality in the first place.
Even if it is assumed that the amount of the price difference in
these cases can be the measure of damages, there is a suggestion in
Russellville that this should be reduced by the extent to which the
price difference was justified by the difference in cost.' In many cases
the issue would not arise because of the absence of any evidence of cost
justification. It sometimes might be possible, however, for the defendant to prove that cost differences justified a price difference of ten
cents per unit, while the price difference actually given was fifteen
cents. On those facts the Russelilville dictum would allow recovery of
only the five-cent difference, on the theory that a ten-cent difference
176

38 Stat. L. 730 (1914), 49 Stat. L. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §13(a).

177 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 at 47, 68 S.Ct. 822

(1948).

178 See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d)
38 at 56.
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would have been legal, and therefore the only legal injury to the plaintiff came from the discrimination in excess of ten cents. Other cases
seem not to have discussed this point.
The Sun Cosmetic case makes the suggestion that although the
price difference cannot automatically be the measure of damages, it
does set an upper limit to the damages, since the plaintiff should have
minimized its losses from its lack of a "demonstrator" of defendant's
products by hiring one, if those losses exceeded the cost of hiring such a
person.1' On the facts of this case, that dictum is probably valid,
because plaintiff could pretty clearly have hired a demonstrator and
put itself on equal terms with its competitors in the sale of defendant's
cosmetics. In the price discount cases, however, it can hardly be argued
that the price differences should be the upper limit on damages, since
the plaintiff always pays the higher price as a matter of course, and in
fact if he did not he would not be a "purchaser" under the statute,
and no discrimination would have occurred. Even if he does pay the
higher price in such cases, the plaintiff may be unable to sell at a figure
which will enable him to compete with more favored buyers from the
defendant, so that he may very well lose business in excess of the price
difference."'8 It may be argued that he could prevent that by meeting
the favored competitor's prices, so that all other things being equal,
the amount of the price difference would equal the loss of profits, but
the plaintiff may be financially unable to sell at such a price and stay
in business. It therefore would be unreasonable to require him to
minimize his losses in that way. For that reason Judge Hand's dictum
is much too inclusive, and is applicable only in cases whose facts
resemble the facts before him.
VI. Recovery of Costs and Attorney's Fees
The statute's provision for recovery of costs pretty clearly applies
only to the usual taxable costs. 8 ' Items of cost not usually considered
taxable have been sought by plaintiffs, but have generally been
denied."8 2
17 9 See Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., (2d Cir. 1949)
178 F. (2d) 150 at 153. See also American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., (8th Cir.
1951) 191 F. (2d) 38 at 55.
180 See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., (8th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d)
38 at 61.
181 Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1924) 297 F. 791.
8
1 2 Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., (D.C. Mo. 1951)
11 F.R.D. 259. This case suggests that counsel should have especially large or unusual
costs authorized by the court in pre-trial conference before they are incurred.
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The attorneys' fees recoverable under the statute, it is well settled,
must be reasonable.' 8 3 Judging from the reported cases, there are
nearly as many notions of what is reasonable as there are judges. 8"
The most recent discussion of the matter is in the Milwaukee Towne
case,' 85 where the court of appeals reduced the fee allowed by the
district court from $225,000 to $75,000, on the ground that the larger
amount was "shocking to [its] sense of reason and justice."'86 There
had been evidence of the large number of hours spent by three lawyers
in the preparation and trial of the case, and testimony by three leading
members of the Chicago bar that a fee of from $175,000 to $250,000
would be reasonable. Although each fee proceeding must be decided
pretty much on its own facts, the court did make some observations
which are of general application: (1) The agreement of attorney and
client is immaterial in determining what is reasonable. (2) These
antitrust cases are no longer so unique as they once were, and so

compensation should be determined in the same manner as for any
other case of comparable size. Here the evidence was that competent
trial attorneys could be employed in Chicago for $40 per hour, and
that assistants commonly received $20 per hour.'87 These figures,
multiplied by the hours spent on the case, gave the fee of $75,000.

(3) Although the result achieved in the litigation should be considered,
the relevant figure is that of the actual damages proved, not the
damages after being trebled.
183 Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (2d Cir. 1924) 297 F. 791. The court
reduced the attorney fee on appeal because the plaintiff lost part of his judgment, and the
award of the fee had been partly based on the amount of damages. The court also denied
recovery of attorney fees in a prior suit, found to have been brought by the defendant
against this plaintiff as part of defendant's illegal restraint of trade. The holding is of
doubtful validity on this point, in view of the damages rule that where the defendant's tort
has made it necessary for the plaintiff to bring or defend a suit, the expences of that suit
may be recovered in the later litigation. See McComncx, DAmAGEs 247, 248 (1935).
184 See the table in Donovan and Irvine, 'Proof of Damages under, the Anti-Trust
Law," 88 UN-v. PA. L. Ruv. 511, n. 1 (1940). The authors found a wide variation in
the relation between attorney fees and judgments. The same variations may be found in
more recent cases. In the following the first figure is the damages before trebling, and the
second the fee: Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 561
($313,858.10, $75,000); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp.,
(8th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 846 ($375,000, $100,000); Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 70 ($412,000, $250,000); American Can Co.
v. Bruce's Juices, (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 73 ($60,000, $40,000).
185 (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (24) 561.
186 Id. at 569.
187 A more recent case in Illinois has adopted the same method of computing attorneys'
fees. Sager Glove Corp. v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., CCH Trade Reg. Serv., 1951
Trade Cases, 62,956.
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In spite of the courts' attempts to limit the large fees produced by
these cases, the lawyers' compensation is still generous to say the least.
The fee in the Brookside case has even attained the doubtful eminence
of envious comment in a national magazine,"" leading one to conclude
that stricter judicial restraint should be imposed in keeping counsel
fees within bounds.
Conclusion
The law of damages is ordinarily concerned with the amount of the
plaintiff's losses. In the antitrust cases the plaintiff has not "lose' anything in the usual sense of that word, but his activities have been interfered with in such a way as to impair his chances for success in business. In deciding. how he should be compensated for the unlawful
interference, the courts have relied on four kinds of evidence: (1)
estimates by experts of what the plaintiff would have earned; (2)
comparison with plaintiff's earnings in a prior period; (3) comparison
with defendant's earnings or those of a comparable competitor; (4)
the difference in prices charged plaintiff and his competitor.
Reliance upon evidence of this kind makes it plain that the traditional subjective "rule" that damages must be proved with "reasonable
certainty" no longer has any meaning. How could a court say in the
complex context of the usual treble damage case that it was reasonably
certain that the plaintiff would have earned one sum or another? In
fact, this so-called rule was nothing more than a statement of the result
of the case, in a form which gave the appellate court an excuse to upset
awards where that seemed desirable.
As more treble damage suits were brought, it became equally plain
that this judicial approach to the problem would prevent any recovery
at all in a majority of the cases. The response to this dilemma, in which
the Supreme Court led the way, was to substitute for a subjective,
question-begging "rule," an intelligible standard of relevant evidence
informing the trier of fact what he might take into account. If he bases
his award on that sort of evidence, the judgment will be affirmed. The
damages doctrine has thus been redefined in operational terms, that is,
in terms of what the parties and the trier of fact may do in getting the
case decided.
Although this has produced some judgments which are large enough
188 Tm , June 16, 1952, p. 89.
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to be startling, as an approach to damages it is not novel, as witness,
for example, the ascertainment of damages for wrongful death.'.. It
appeals to the writer as a workable solution to the problem.
189 See McCoRAdc,
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